Michael M Ting

Michael M Ting

Biography

Michael M. Ting (Ph.D., Stanford, Graduate School of Business, 1999) specializes in American politics and formal models of political institutions, with a focus on bureaucracy, elections, and legislatures. Some of his recent projects are on primary elections, federalism, bureaucratic politics, and the quality of governance. He is also an author of A Behavioral Theory of Elections (Princeton Press, 2011) with Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier and David Siegel. His current projects include the development of government personnel systems and organizational turf wars.

Professor Ting teaches in the department and in the School of International and Public Affairs. Prior to joining the department in 2002, he taught at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and held two postdoctoral fellowships at Harvard University.

2011. A Behavioral Theory of Elections. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (with Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, and David Siegel)

Forthcoming. “Primary Elections and the Provision of Public Goods.” Journal of Politics. (with Shigeo Hirano and James Snyder)

Forthcoming. “Turf Wars.” Journal of Public Economics. (with Helios Herrera and Ernesto Reuben)

2017. “Politics and Administration.” American Journal of Political Science 61(2): 305-319.

2016. “Collective Action, Aspirations, Reference Groups.” Political Science Research and Methods 4(3): 451-476. (with Jonathan Bendor and Daniel Diermeier)

2015. “Direct and Indirect Representation.” British Journal of Political Science 45(3): 609-634. (with Shigeo Hirano) (DOI)

2013. “Elections and Reform: The Adoption of Civil Service Systems in the U.S. States.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 24(3): 363-387. (with Olle Folke, Shigeo Hirano, and James Snyder)

2013. “Redistribution and Pork in Two-Party Competition.” Journal of the European Economic Association 11(6): 1382-1403. (with John Huber)

2012. “Legislatures, Bureaucracies and Distributive Spending.” American Political Science Review 106(2): 367-385. (DOI)

2011. “Electoral Selection with Parties and Primaries.” American Journal of Political Science 55(4): 782-796. (with James Snyder)

2011. “Organizational Capacity.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 27(2): 245-271.

2010. “Early Entrant Protection in Approval Regulation: Theory and Evidence from FDA Drug Review.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 26(3): 515-545. (with Daniel Carpenter, Susan I. Moffitt, Colin D. Moore, Ryan T. Rynbrandt, Ian Yohai, and Evan James Zucker)

2009. “Distributive Politics with Primaries.” Journal of Politics 71(4): 1467-1480. (with Shigeo Hirano and James Snyder)

2009. “Two’s Company, Three’s an Equilibrium: Strategic Voting and Multicandidate Elections.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 4(3): 251-278. (with John W. Patty and James Snyder)

2008. “A Formal Model of Learning and Policy Diffusion.” American Political Science Review 102(3): 319-332. (with Craig Volden and Daniel Carpenter) (DOI)

2008. “Whistleblowing.” American Political Science Review 102(2): 249-267. (DOI)

2008. “Interest Groups and the Electoral Control of Politicians.” Journal of Public Economics 92(3-4): 482-500. (with James Snyder)

2007. “Regulatory Errors With Endogenous Agendas.” American Journal of Political Science 51(4): 835-852. (with Daniel Carpenter)

2007. “Comment: Adaptive Models in Sociology and the Problem of Empirical Content.” American Journal of Sociology 112(5): 1534-1545. (with Jonathan Bendor and Daniel Diermeier)

2005. “The Political Logic of Regulatory Error: Some Theoretical Reflections on the Vioxx Episode.” Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 4(10): 819-823. (with Daniel Carpenter)

2005. “Legislative Bargaining Under Weighted Voting.” American Economic Review95(4): 981-1004. (with James Snyder and Stephen Ansolabehere)

2009. “Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting: Corrigendum.American Economic Review Internet Corrigendum. (with Alexandre Debs and James Snyder)

2005. “Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments.” American Journal of Political Science 49(3): 550-563. (with Stephen Ansolabehere, James Snyder, and Aaron Strauss)

2005. “Why Roll Calls? A Model of Position-Taking in Legislative Voting and Elections.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 21(1): 153-178. (with James Snyder)

2003. “Roll Calls, Party Labels, and Elections.” Political Analysis 11(4): 419-444. (with James Snyder)

2003. “Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does Malapportionment Matter?” American Political Science Review 97(3): 471-481. (with Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder) (DOI)

2003. “A Behavioral Model of Turnout.” American Political Science Review 97(2): 261-280. (with Jonathan Bendor and Daniel Diermeier) (DOI)

2003. “A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy.” American Journal of Political Science 47(2): 274-292.

2002. “A Theory of Jurisdictional Assignments in Bureaucracies.” American Journal of Political Science 46(2): 364-378.

2002. “An Informational Rationale for Political Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 46(1): 90-110. (with James Snyder)

2001. “The ‘Power of the Purse’ and its Implications for Bureaucratic Policy-Making.” Public Choice 106(3-4): 243-274.

"Civil Service and Patronage in Bureaucracies” (with John Huber)

"Inequality, Aspirations, and Social Comparisons" (with Jonathan Bendor and Daniel Diermeier)


"Direct and Indirect Representation Online Appendix" (with Shigeo Hirano)


"A Formal Model of Learning and Policy Diffusion: A Comment on Multiple Unknown Policies" (with Craig Volden and Daniel Carpenter)

  • Supplementary appendix to “A Formal Model of Learning and Policy Diffusion” (American Political Science Review 102(3), 2008)


"Equilibria in Multi-Dimensional, Multi-Party Spatial Competition" (with James Snyder)

"The Empirical Content of Adaptive Models" (with Jonathan Bendor and Daniel Diermeier)

Courses Taught