

**Colloquium on Cooperation and Security**  
**Political Science G8864**

**Spring 2011**  
**meets Wednesdays 2:10-4:00, IAB 1102**  
**office hours: Weds & Thurs 4:00-5:00**

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The study of cooperation is fundamental to the study of international relations. In the absence of a higher authority to enforce agreements, how do states manage to cooperate? This course examines theoretical approaches to conflict and cooperation in international relations, including the obstacles to cooperation under anarchy, and the possibility of surmounting those obstacles. The empirical focus of the course is on issues of cooperation in peace and security, for example, deterrence and crisis bargaining, the outbreak and conduct of war, war termination and maintaining peace, and alliance politics.

**Prerequisites:**

General familiarity with theories and literatures of international relations. Students who have not taken, or are not currently taking, the International Relations Field Survey (6801) should discuss with the instructor whether this course is appropriate.

**Course Requirements:**

Students are expected to come to class ready to discuss the week's readings.

Twice during the semester each student will prepare a short memo (2-4 pages double-spaced) briefly outlining the major themes of the session, raising questions for discussion in class, and suggesting a few testable hypotheses on the week's topic. These are due (to be posted to CourseWorks) no later than 5pm, the Monday before the relevant class.

The major assignment for the course is a research paper. The paper should present publishable-quality original research on a topic related to cooperation and security. A statement of your proposed research question and hypotheses is due February 23. Presentations will take place on April 13, 20, and 27. The final paper is due Monday, May 9.

Late assignments, including memos, will be penalized by one third grade per day (i.e., an A paper or memo turned in 1 day late is an A-, 2 days late a B+, etc.), except in cases of medical or family emergency.

The written research paper will count for 40% of the grade, its presentation in class for 20%, each memo 10%, and participation in class for the remaining 20%.

Requirements for R credit and auditors: the two memos and participation in class discussion (which requires doing the reading).

## Readings

The following books (readings marked with an asterisk (\*) in the syllabus) have been ordered at Book Culture Bookstore, on 112th St., between Broadway and Amsterdam. They are also available on reserve at Lehman.

Axelrod, Robert *Evolution of Cooperation* revised edition (Basic Books 2006).  
ISBN: 0465021212

Baldwin, David ed. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism* (Columbia University Press, 1993).  
ISBN: 0231084412

Bull, Hedley *The Anarchical Society*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Columbia University Press, 2002).  
ISBN: 9780231127639

Cronin, Bruce *Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation* (Columbia University Press, 1999).  
ISBN: 0231115970

Fortna, Virginia Page *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton University Press, 2008)  
ISBN: 9780691136714

Kreps, Sarah *Coalitions of Convenience: US Military Intervention after the Cold War* (Oxford University Press, 2010)  
ISBN: 9780199753802

Olson, Mancur *The Logic of Collective Action* (Harvard University Press, 1965).  
ISBN: 0674537513

Oye, Kenneth ed. *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton University Press, 1986).  
ISBN: 0691022402

Paul, T.V., Patrick Morgan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age* (University of Chicago Press, 2009)  
ISBN 9780226650036

Reiter, Dan *How Wars End* (Princeton University Press, 2009)  
ISBN: 9780691140605

Walter, Barbara and Jack Snyder, eds. *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (Columbia University Press, 1999).  
ISBN: 0231116276

Journal articles and book chapters are available online through e-journals or through electronic reserves on CourseWorks.

I assume that some readings will be familiar to you from 6801, please review them for the relevant weeks.

**Session 1. Introduction and Course Logistics**  
**January 19**

**I. Cooperation Theory in International Relations**

**Session 2. The Evolution of Cooperation under Anarchy**  
**January 26**

\*Axelrod, Robert *Evolution of Cooperation* (Basic Books 2006). Chapters 1-3, 6-9.  
(review from 6801)

Jervis, Robert “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” *World Politics* 30:2 (January 1978),  
pp. 168-214. (review from 6801)

\*Oye, Kenneth ed. *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton University Press, 1986). Chapters by  
Oye “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy” (review from 6801)  
Axelrod & Keohane “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy”

\*Stein, Arthur “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World” in Baldwin,  
David ed. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism* (Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 29-59.

Keohane, Robert “Reciprocity in International Relations” *International Organization* 40:1  
(Winter 1986), pp. 1-27.

Jervis, Robert “Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation,” *World Politics* 40:3 (April 1988), pp.  
317-349. (review from 6801)

Fearon, James “Bargaining Enforcement, and International Cooperation” *International  
Organization* 52:2 (Spring 1998), pp. 269-305. (review from 6801)

Majeski, Stephen J. “Asymmetric Power among Agents and the Generation and Maintenance of  
Cooperation in International Relations” *International Studies Quarterly* 48:2 (June  
2004).

Pahre, Robert, “International Cooperation as Interagency Cooperation: Examples from Wildlife  
and Habitat Prevention” *Perspectives on Politics* 7:4 (December 2009), pp.883-899.

**Session 3. Information, Credibility and Signaling, and Domestic Politics**  
**February 2**

Morrow, James “The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics” in Lake, David and Robert Powell eds, *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 77-114.

Putnam, Robert “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” *International Organization* 42:3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460. (review from 6801)

Akerlof, George “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 54:3 (August 1970), pp. 488-500.

Farrell, Joseph and Matthew Rabin “Cheap Talk” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10:3 (Summer 1996), pp. 103-18.

Fearon, James “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands and Sinking Costs” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41:1 (February 1997), pp. 68-90.

Schultz, Kenneth “Looking for Audience Costs” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45:1 (February 2001), pp. 32-60.

Tomz, Michael “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach” *International Organization* 61:4 (Fall 2007), pp. 821-40.

Weeks, Jessica “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve” *International Organization* 62:1 (Winter 2008), pp. 35-64.

**Sesssion 4. Debates: Realism vs. Institutionalism, Offensive vs. Defensive Realism**  
**February 9**

Keohane, Robert "The Demand for International Regimes" in Krasner, Stephen ed. *International Regimes* (Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 141-71.

\*Baldwin, David ed, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*. Following chapters:

1 – Baldwin "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics" (intro)

5 – Grieco "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation"

7 – Snidal "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation"

11 – Keohane "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War"

12 – Grieco "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation"

Mearsheimer, John "The False Promise of International Institutions" *International Security* 19:3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49; responses by Keohane & Martin, Kupchan & Kupchan, and Ruggie, and Mearsheimer's reply in *International Security* 20:1 (Summer 1995), pp.39-69, 82-93. (review from 6801)

Lake, David "Beyond Anarchy: The Importance of Security Institutions" *International Security* 26:1 (Summer 2001), pp.129-160.

Jervis, Robert "Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate" *International Security* 24:1 (Summer 1999), pp.42-63. (review from 6801)

Glaser, Charles "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help" *International Security* 19:3 (Winter 1994-1995), pp. 50-90 (reprinted in *Security Studies* 5:3 (Spring 1996), pp.122-63).

Schweller, Randall "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma" *Security Studies* 5:3 (Spring 1996), pp.90-121. (available through e-reserves)

Kydd, Andrew "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other" *Security Studies* 7:1 (Autumn 1997), pp.114-54.

Montgomery, Evan Braden "Breaking out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty" *International Security* 31:2 (Fall 2006), pp. 151-85. (See also Correspondence in IS 32:1 (Summer 2007)).

**Session 5. Collective Action, Order and the Construction of Cooperation and Conflict in the International System**  
**February 16**

\*Olson, Mancur *The Logic of Collective Action* (Harvard University Press, 1965). Intro and chapters 1-2, pp. 1-65.

\*Bull, Hedley *The Anarchical Society* (Columbia University Press, 1977). Chapters 1-3.

Watts, Sir Arthur "The Importance of International Law" in Michael Byers, ed. *The Role of Law in International Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 5-16.

Abbott, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance" *International Organization* 54:3 (Summer 2000), pp. 421-456.

Johnston, A. Iain "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments" *International Studies Quarterly* 45:4 (December 2001) pp. 487-515. (review from 6801)

Wendt, Alex "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of State Politics" *International Organization* 46:2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

\*Cronin, Bruce *Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation* (Columbia University Press, 1999) Chapters 1-2 and 6, pp. 3-38, 125-141. (review from 6801)

Keene, Edward "A Case Study of the Construction of International Hierarchy: British Treaty-Making Against the Slave Trade in the Early Nineteenth Century" *International Organization* 61:2 (Spring 2007), pp. 311-339.

Sandholtz, Wayne *Prohibiting Plunder: How Norms Change* (Oxford University Press, 2007), Chapter 1, pp. 1-29.

Finnemore, Martha "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be" *World Politics* 61:1 (January 2009), pp. 58-85.

## II. Cooperation in Security Affairs

### **Session 6. War as a Problem of Cooperation February 23**

#### **\*\* Research Proposal Due \*\***

Fearon, James “Rationalist Explanations for War” *International Organization* 49:3 (Summer 1995), pp.379-414. (review from 6801)

Reiter, Dan “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War” *Perspectives on Politics* 1:1 (March 2003), pp. 27-43.

Powell, Robert “War as a Commitment Problem” *International Organization* 60:1 (Winter 2006), pp.169–203.

Gartzke, Erik “War is in the Error Term” *International Organization* 53:3 (Summer 1999), pp.567-87 (review from 6801)

Posen, Barry “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict” in Brown, Michael, ed. *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-24. (Originally published in *Survival*).

\*Walter, Barbara and Jack Snyder, eds. *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (Columbia University Press, 1999). Chapters:  
1– Snyder & Jervis “Civil War and the Security Dilemma” (review from 6801)  
8 – de Figueiredo & Weingast “The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict”

Fearon, James “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict” in Lake, David and Donald Rothchild, eds, *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict* (Princeton University Press, 1998).

Schultz, Kenneth “The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict Over Rebel Support in Civil War” *International Organization* 64:2 (Spring 2010), pp. 281-312.

**Session 7. Deterrence, Crisis Bargaining, and Reputation**  
**March 2**

Schelling, Thomas *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966). Chapter 2.

Fearon, James “Signaling vs the Balance of Power and Interests” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38:2 (June 1994), pp. 236-69.

Jervis, Robert “Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior” in Jervis, Robert and Jack Snyder, eds *Dominoes and Bandwagons* (Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 21-50.

Sartori, Anne “The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes” *International Organization* 56:1 (Winter 2002), pp. 121-49.

\*Paul, T.V., Patrick Morgan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age* (University of Chicago Press, 2009), chapters 1-6, 9, 12.



**Session 8. Arms, Arms Control and the Conduct of War**  
**March 9**

Schelling, Thomas and Morton Halperin *Strategy and Arms Control* (Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), Intro and chapters 1-3, pp. 1-39.

Glaser, Charles “When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming” *International Security* 28:4 (Spring 2004), pp. 44-84.

\*Axelrod, *Evolution of Cooperation*. Chapter 4 “Live & Let Live in Trench Warfare in WWI.”

Tannenwald, Nina “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo” *International Security* 29:4 (Spring 2005), pp. 5-49.

Morrow, James D. “When Do States Follow the Laws of War?” *American Political Science Review* 101:3 (August 2007), pp. 559-572.

Downes, Alexander B. “Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: the Causes of Civilian Victimization in War” *International Security* 30:4 (Spring 2006), pp. 152-195.

Nincic, Miroslav “Getting What You Want: Positive Inducements in International Relations” *International Security* 35:1 (Summer 2010), pp. 138-183.

Efrat, Asif “Toward Internationally Regulated Goods: Controlling the Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons” *International Organization* 64:1 (Winter 2010), pp. 97-131.

**Spring Break**

**Session 9. Negotiation and War Termination**  
**March 23**

Raiffa, Howard *The Art and Science of Negotiation* (Harvard University Press, 1982). Chapter 4 pp. 44-65.

Wittman, Donald “How War Ends: A Rational Model Approach” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23:4 (1979), pp.743-763.

Goemans, Hein “Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44:5 (October 2000), pp.555-579.

\*Walter, Barbara F. “Designing Transitions from Civil War” in Walter, Barbara and Jack Snyder, eds. *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 38-69.

Schultz, Kenneth “The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?” *International Organization* 59:1 (Winter 2005), pp. 1-38.

\*Reiter, Dan *How Wars End* (Princeton University Press, 2009), chapters 1-4, one case study chapter, and chapter 11.

Langlois, Catherine and Jean-Pierre Langlois “Does Attrition Behavior Help Explain the Duration of Interstate Wars?” *International Studies Quarterly* 53:4 (December 2009), pp. 1051-1073.

Stanley Elizabeth A, and John P. Sawyer “Multiple Paths to Ending War” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53:5 (October 2009), pp. 651-676.

**Session 10. Maintaining Peace**  
**March 30**

Fortna, Virginia Page “Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace” *International Organization* 57:2 (Spring 2003). (review from 6801)

Werner, Suzanne and Amy Yuen “Making and Keeping Peace” *International Organization* 59:2 (Spring 2005), pp. 261-292.

Quinn, J. Michael, T. David Mason, and Mehmet Gurses “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence” *International Interactions* 33:2 (2007), pp. 167-193.

\*Fortna, Virginia Page *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War* (Princeton University Press, 2008), chapters 1, 4, and 5.

Autesserre, Severine “Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention” *International Organization* 63:2 (Spring 2009), pp. 249-80.

Jarstad, Anna K. and Desirée Nilsson “From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords” *Journal of Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25:3 (Fall 2008), pp.206-223.

\*Kaufmann, Chaim “When All Else Fails: Evaluating Population Transfers and Partition as Solutions to Ethnic Conflict” in Walter, Barbara F. and Jack Snyder, ed.s *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (Columbia University Press 1999). pp. 221-60.

Sambanis, Nicholas “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature” *World Politics* 52:4 (July 2000), pp. 437-483

## **Session 11. Cooperation among Allies**

**April 6**

Olson, Mancur and Richard Zeckhauser "An Economic Theory of Alliances" *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 48:3 (August 1966), pp. 266-279.

Leeds, Brett Ashley "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties" *International Organization* 57:4 (November 2003) pp. 801-827.

Weber, Katya "Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: A Transactions Costs Approach to International Security Cooperation" *International Studies Quarterly* 41:2 (June 1997), pp. 321-40.

Barnett, Michael "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East" in Katzenstein, Peter, ed. *The Culture of National Security* (Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 400-47.

\*Kreps, Sarah *Coalitions of Convenience: US Military Intervention after the Cold War* (Oxford University Press, 2010), chapters 1-3, 6-8.

Gibler, Douglas "The Cost of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52:3 (June 2008), pp.426-454.

Walt, Stephen "Alliances in a Unipolar World" *World Politics* 61:1 (January 2009), pp.86-120.

## **Session 12-14. Research Paper Presentations**

**April 13, April 20, April 27**

**\*\* Final paper is due Monday May 9, by 5pm \*\***

## Selected Additional Readings

### Theory:

- Keohane, Robert *After Hegemony* (Princeton University Press, 1984).
- Milner, Helen "International Theories of Cooperation Among States: Strengths and Weaknesses" *World Politics* 44:3 (1992), pp.466-496.
- Fearon, James "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes" *American Political Science Review* 88:3 (September 1994), pp. 577-92.
- Axelrod and Keohane in Baldwin ed *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*.
- McGinnis, Michael "Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30 (March 1986), pp.141-70.
- Morrow, James "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation," *International Organization* 48:3 (Summer 1994), pp. 387-423.
- Dai, Xinyuan "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism," *International Organization* vol 59:2 (Spring 2005), pp. 363-398.
- Downs, George David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News about Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50:3 (Summer 1996), pp. 379-406.
- Wagner, R. Harrison "The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation" *American Political Science Review* 77:2 (June 1983), pp.330-346
- Bendor, Jonathan "Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37:4 (December 1993), pp.709-34
- Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101:4 (November 2007), pp. 709- 725.
- Keohane "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics" and "International Institutions: Two Approaches" in *International Institutions and State Power* (Westview 1989).
- Wendt's response to Mearsheimer's "False Promise" – "Constructing International Politics" *International Security* 20:1 (Summer 1995) pp.71-81.
- Katzenstein, Peter ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); chapters 1 (Katzenstein), and 2 (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein).
- Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett eds. *Security Communities* (Cambridge University Press, 1998).
- Bearce, David and Stacy Bondanella "Intergovernmental Organizations Socialization and Member-State Interest Convergence " *International Organization* 61:4 (October 2007), pp. 703-733.
- Sandholtz, Wayne and Kendall Stiles *International Norms and Cycles of Change* (Oxford University Press, 2008).
- Higgins, Roslyn "The Nature and Function of International Law" in *Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it* (Clarendon Press, 1994).
- George Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation? *International Organization* 50 (1996) pp., 379- 406.

- Kenneth O. W. Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal "The Concept of Legalization" *International Organization* 54:3 (August 2000), pp 401-419.
- von Stein, Jana "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance" *American Political Science Review* 99 (2005) 611-622
- Snyder, Jack "Anarchy and Culture: Insights from the Anthropology of War" *International Organization* 56:1 (Winter 2000), pp. 7-45.
- Taliaferro, Jeffrey "Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited" *International Security* vol 25:3 (Winter 2000/2001), pp. 128-161.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- Kydd, Andrew "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation" *International Organization* 54:2 (Spring 2000), pp. 325-57.

#### War:

- Schelling, Thomas *The Strategy of Conflict* (Harvard University Press, 1960).
- Barry O'Neill, "International Escalation and the Dollar Auction," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 30:1 (March, 1986), pp. 33-50.
- Rothchild, Donald and David Lake "Containing Fear: Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict" *International Security* 21:2 (Fall 1996), pp. 41-75.
- Powell, Robert "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict" *Annual Review of Political Science* 5 (2002), pp. 1-30.
- Slantchev, Branislav "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States" *American Political Science Review* 97, no 1 (February 2003), pp. 123-133.
- Reed, William "Information, Power, and War" *American Political Science Review* 97, no 4 (November 2003), pp. 633-641.
- Quester, George "Crises and the Unexpected" in Rotberg, Robert and Theodore Rabb eds, *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp.127-45.
- Reiter, Dan "Exploding the Powder-Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars almost Never Happen" *International Security* 20:2 (Fall 1995), pp. 5-34.
- Thyne, Clayton "Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil War" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50:6 (December 2006) pp. 937-961.

#### Deterrence and Reputation:

- Mearsheimer, John *Conventional Deterrence* (Cornell University Press, 1983).
- Huth, Paul *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (Yale University Press, 1988). esp. Chapters 1-3.
- Danilovic, Vesna "The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45:3 (June 2001), pp. 341-69.

- Danilovic, Vesna "Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45:1 (February 2001), pp. 97-125.
- George, Alexander and Richard Smoke *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (Columbia University Press, 1974).
- Zagare, Frank "Classical Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment" *International Interactions* 21:4 (1996) pp. 365-87.
- Zagare, Frank C. "Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-Examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory" *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 16:2 (2004) pp. 107-141.
- Langlois, Jean-Pierre and Catherine Langlois "Fully Informed and on the Road to Ruin: The Perfect Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence" *International Studies Quarterly* vol 49:3 (2005) pp. 503-527.
- Trager, Robert and Dessislava Zagorcheva "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done" *International Security* 30:3 (Winter 2005/2006), pp. 87-123.
- Morrow, James "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: a Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining" *AJPS* 33 (November 1989) pp.941-72.
- Gelpi, Christopher "Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining"
- Leng, Russell "Reciprocating Influence Strategies in Interstate Crisis Bargaining" *JCR* 37 (March 1993) pp. 3-41.
- Nalebuff, Barry "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World" *World Politics* 43:3 (April 1991), pp. 313-335.
- Werner, Suzanne "Deterring Intervention: The Stakes of War and Third-Party Involvement" *American Journal of Political Science* 44:4 (October 2000) pp. 720-732.
- Guisinger, Alexandra and Alastair Smith "Honest Threats: the Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46:2 (April 2002), pp. 175-200.
- Tomz, Michael *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries* (Princeton University Press, 2007), Chapter 2, pp. 14-36.
- Mercer, Jonathan *Reputation and International Politics* (Cornell University Press, 1996). See also Copeland, Huth, and Mercer. Debate on Mercer's book in *Security Studies* 7:1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 33-113.

#### Conduct of War and Arms Control:

- Jervis, Robert "Arms Control, Stability, and the Causes of War" *Political Science Quarterly* 108:2 (Summer 1993), pp. 239-253.
- Legro, Jeffrey "Which Norms Matter?" *International Organization* 51:1 (winter 1997), pp. 31-63.
- Price, Richard "A Geneology of the Chemical Weapons Taboo" *International Organization* 49:1 (Winter 1995), pp.73-103.
- Price, Richard "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Landmines" *International Organization* 52:3 (Summer 1998), pp.613-44.
- Price, Richard and Nina Tannenwald " Norms and Deterrence, the Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboo" in Katzenstein, Peter, ed. *The Culture of National Security*

- (Columbia University Press, 1996), pp.114-52.
- Paul, T.V. "Nuclear Weapons Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflict" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39:4 (December 1995), pp. 696-717.
- Rutherford, Kenneth "The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines" *World Politics* 53:1 (October 2000), pp.74-114.
- Bunn, George "The Status of Norms Against Nuclear Testing" *The Nonproliferation Review* (Winter 1999), pp. 20-32
- Downs, George, David Rock and Randolph Siverson "Arms Races and Cooperation" in Oye, ed. *Cooperation Under Anarchy*.
- Gaubatz, Kurt "Changing Interests and Persistent Rules: The Protection of Non-Combatants in War" unpublished manuscript.
- Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," *International Organization* 46:1 (Winter 1992), pp. 101-146.
- Morrow, James "Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms Control" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35:2 (June 1991). pp. 245-265.
- Knopf, Jeffrey *Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on US Arms Control Policy* (Cambridge University Press 1998).
- Gallagher, Nancy *The Politics of Verification* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
- Morrow, James D. "The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties" *International Organization* 55:4 (Autumn 2001), pp. 971-91.
- Gilligan, Michael J. "Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime" *International Organization* 60:4 (Summer 2004) pp. 935-967.
- Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy M. Weinstein "Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War" *American Political Science Review* 100:3 (August 2006), pp. 429-447.

#### War Termination and Maintaining Peace:

- Pillar, Paul *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process* (Princeton University Press, 1983).
- Mason, T. David, and Patrick J. Fett. "How Civil Wars End: a Rational Model Approach" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40:4 (1996) pp.546-68.
- Walter, Barbara. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement" *International Organization* 51:3 (summer 1997) pp.335-364.
- Walter, Barbara F. *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton University Press 2002).
- Trumbore, Peter "Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-Level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process" *International Studies Quarterly* 42:3. (September 1998), pp545-66.
- Gartner, Scott "I'm OK, You're OK, Let's Fight: An Organizational and Game Theoretic Model of War Termination"
- Goemans, Hein *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First*



- World War* (Princeton University Press, 2000). Chapters 1-3, skim one or two case studies.
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