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Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars

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Arguably the most important innovation in conflict management in the last fifty years is the practice of peacekeeping: the concept of sending personnel from the international community to help keep peace in the aftermath of war.[1] What is now referred to as "traditional peacekeeping" developed during the Cold War and generally involved international personnel monitoring a cease-fire, or placing themselves between belligerent armies. Most peacekeeping operations during the Cold War involved wars between sovereign states (exceptions include United Nations [UN] missions in the Congo, Lebanon, and Cyprus, and the Organization of African Unity's mission in Chad). Since the end of the Cold War, the international community and the UN have moved beyond traditional peacekeeping, becoming much more involved in civil conflicts. Doing so has meant adding a new set of functions—election monitoring, police training, sometimes even administering the state—to facilitate the transition from war to peace.

Scholars and practitioners of peacekeeping have debated the merits of the new wave of more "robust" and complex forms of peacekeeping and peace enforcement developed after the Cold War and the effectiveness of more traditional forms of peacekeeping (Tharoor 1995/96; Luttwak 1999). The conventional wisdom in this debate is that the international community has been better at peacekeeping between states than within them. But no one has tested this assumption. There is a dearth of rigorous empirical studies of the effects of peacekeeping in either setting, let alone a comparison of the two. Does peace last longer when peacekeepers are deployed than when belligerents are left to their own devices? And are the effects of peacekeeping different after internal and interstate conflicts? This article presents some preliminary analysis of the effects of peacekeeping on the duration of peace in both interstate and civil conflicts to begin to answer these questions.

The assumption that peacekeeping would be less effective in internal conflicts than between states stems first from the fact that civil wars presented a new challenge to the UN. By the end of the Cold War, the established principles and practices of interstate peacekeeping rested on decades of experience. Applying this tool to internal wars meant developing new practices and operating in an unfamiliar environment. No longer could peacekeepers simply interpose themselves between well-defined armies and keep watch along a fixed cease-fire line. Now they had to become involved in disarmament, in military training for newly created unified armies, in electoral procedures, and many other civilian tasks.

[1] Peacekeeping is usually done by the UN, but regional organizations have also undertaken it. The Organization of American States monitored the ceasefire between El Salvador and Honduras after the Football War; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the primary peacekeeper in Bosnia. Peacekeeping is also sometimes performed by an ad hoc group. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee sent monitors to observe the cease-fire in Korea.

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Because these procedures were new, they were difficult. Moreover, the few prior experiences of peacekeeping in civil wars, such as in the Congo, had not gone well.

Second, the conventional wisdom is that it is harder to maintain peace after civil wars than after interstate wars. Maintaining peace after either type of war requires cooperation, and there are significant obstacles to cooperation in both. In each case, the actors are deadly enemies with good reason to try to take advantage of each other and to fear the worst about the other's intentions. In the atmosphere of deep mistrust after mortal combat, even small provocations or incidents can spark renewed warfare. The processes that might lead to a resumption of conflict—aggression, security dilemma spirals, and accidental escalation—are likely to operate in similar ways within and between states. For a fuller theoretical discussion of the cooperation required to maintain peace after war, see Page Fortna (forthcoming:Ch. 1).

Nonetheless, there are plausible reasons to think that the problem may be more difficult for internal wars. The necessity of living together within one state requires that parties settle their political differences (whether by force or negotiation). Unlike sovereign states that have fought each other, belligerents in civil wars cannot easily reach an armistice in which they retreat to opposite sides of a cease-fire line and agree to disagree indefinitely. This process is quite common after interstate wars, but in internal conflicts the basic issue is who rules, which is more difficult to put on hold. After civil wars, individual soldiers come into contact with their former enemies and their civilian victims. A border does not separate them. Retribution and reconciliation are therefore day-to-day rather than abstract issues. Barbara Walter (2001) argues convincingly that the commitment problem entailed in disarming and creating a single national army makes reaching a stable negotiated settlement much harder for civil war combatants than for sovereign states.

That peace is likely harder to maintain after civil wars does not necessarily mean that peacekeeping will be less effective, however. In fact, just the opposite might be true. If it is easier for sovereign states to maintain peace, they may be more able to do so on their own; internal belligerents may be more likely to need the help of the international community to overcome the greater obstacles to cooperation. So even if the job of keeping peace is more difficult after civil wars, peacekeeping may make a larger difference in these cases. Peacekeeping may be most effective in civil wars precisely because they are more prone to resume if left alone.

This article has four sections. First, it surveys the literature on peacekeeping, with a focus on the few studies that have systematically addressed, at least in passing, the effects of peacekeeping on peace. The existing studies come to contradictory findings about whether peacekeeping works in either interstate or civil conflicts. None compares the two. The second section addresses the endogeneity of peacekeeping. Because international personnel are not deployed to conflicts at random, like treatments in a laboratory experiment, it is important to take selection effects into account. Any study of the effects of peacekeeping must control for factors that affect both the likelihood that a mission will be deployed and the degree of difficulty of the case. The third section describes the data sets and the quantitative model used in the fourth section to assess the empirical effects of peacekeeping. These findings show that peacekeeping does contribute to more stable peace and suggest, contrary to conventional wisdom, that peacekeeping is no less effective at keeping peace between belligerents in civil wars than between sovereign states. The record of peacekeeping has been at least as good inside as out.

Before proceeding, two caveats about this comparison are in order. Because the two data sets used here were not compiled in exactly the same way, the comparison between civil and interstate wars can only be made tentatively. More important, the distinction between the two types of war is not always clear-cut. Many of the civil wars examined here were heavily "internationalized" by outside intervention, whereas some of the interstate wars were tightly entwined with internal conflicts.

Because of this overlap, some conflicts appear in both data sets: the civil war within Cyprus and the interstate war between Turkey and Cyprus, for example, or the war of partition in India that became an interstate war when Pakistan and India gained independence. For learning about the effectiveness of peacekeeping in different settings, this "double counting" of wars is more appropriate than an attempt to make a clear but arbitrary distinction between them. Nonetheless, the comparison made here should be taken as suggestive rather than definitive.

The Existing Literature: Conflicting Findings

The literature on peacekeeping is vast and growing. It includes evaluations and explanations of a mission's success or failure, debates over the use of force, the merits of nontraditional peacekeeping, and many case studies (see, for example, Wainhouse 1973; Rikhye 1984; Haas 1986; Mackinlay 1989; Diehl 1993; Durch 1993, 1996; Fetherston 1994; Daniel and Hayes 1995; Doyle 1995; Allan 1996; Bratt 1996; Roberts 1996; Zacarias 1996; Coulon 1998; Heje 1998; Ryan 1998; Howard 2001; and the journal *International Peacekeeping*). Surprisingly little of it, however, examines whether or how well peacekeeping works, that is, whether it makes peace more likely to last. Does peace last longer when international personnel are deployed to keep the peace than when belligerents are left to their own devices? Single case studies of peacekeeping either do not address this question or provide only implicit counterfactual assessments (see, for example, Holiday and Stanley 1993; Dawson 1994). Comparative work tends to focus on whether missions are successful or not, taking peacekeeping missions as the universe of cases (for a good example, see Howard 2001; see also Mackinlay 1989; Bratt 1996). Very few studies compare peacekeeping cases to nonpeacekeeping cases; those that do come to contradictory conclusions. These studies include three examining interstate conflicts and three exploring internal conflict.

On the interstate side, there have been a few studies of general UN involvement, including discussion and resolutions, fact-finding and mediating, observation, peacekeeping, and enforcement actions in international crises. Ernst Haas (1986; see also Haas, Butterworth, and Nye 1972) has produced a substantial body of work assessing conflict management by international organizations. In the 1986 study, for example, he examines interstate disputes referred to the UN, to regional organizations, and nonreferred disputes. Of particular note for our purposes, Haas finds that UN operations of a military nature (that is, observer missions, peacekeeping forces, and the one instance of enforcement in Korea) are almost always moderately or largely successful, if success is measured as the organization's impact on stopping hostilities, conflict abatement for three years, conflict settlement, and isolation of the conflict. Haas' measures of success do not allow a direct comparison of disputes involving the UN with nonreferred disputes, however, because "success" is measured only for referred disputes. His measures are based on an implicitly counterfactual assessment, presumably relative to no UN involvement.

In contrast, even though Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher (1984) find that the UN makes it more likely that an interstate crisis ends in an agreement than when this organization is not involved, they find that the UN has no effect on the likelihood of "tension reduction" measured by whether the parties experienced another crisis within five years. Surprisingly, however, in this part of their study, the authors do not consider the endogeneity they have identified in the first part of their article: namely that the UN tends to get involved in the most "serious" cases in terms of violence, gravity of threat, and several other indicators. More on this issue later.

In a similar, but more quantitatively sophisticated, recent study, Paul Diehl, Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul Hensel (1996) also examine the effects of UN

involvement on the recurrence of interstate conflict. Although they do not examine when the UN is most likely to get involved, they do control for other factors that might make recurrence more likely, such as the level of violence, the history of conflict, relative power, and whether the crisis ends in stalemate, compromise, or victory. Diehl and his associates (1996:697), too, find that the UN has no significant effect on the "occurrence, timing, or severity of future conflict." However, they also "control" for the level of UN involvement, which seems to be the very thing they are assessing.

Research examining, at least in passing, the effect of peacekeeping on the duration of peace after civil wars is more recent. In their work on peacebuilding in all civil wars since World War II, Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000:779) find that "multilateral United Nations peace operations make a positive difference." In particular, they find strong evidence that multidimensional peacekeeping, that is, "missions with extensive civilian functions, including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, and election oversight," significantly improve the chances of peace building success, if success is measured both in terms of a durable peace (specifically an end to the war, lower residual violence, and uncontested sovereignty two and five years after the war) and by a stricter measure in terms of a durable peace and a minimum standard of democratization. They find weaker evidence that observer missions and enforcement missions improve the chances for peace, but, surprisingly, that traditional peacekeeping has no effect on the chances for peacebuilding success.

Caroline Hartzell, Mathew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild (2001) examine, among other things, the role of third-party enforcement on the duration of negotiated settlements to civil wars (also in the period since 1945). Their coding of third-party enforcement includes peacekeeping missions (as in Angola, El Salvador, and Mozambique).[2] They find that such third-party involvement significantly and substantially increases the duration of peace. However, in a study using Doyle and Sambanis' data set but more sophisticated statistical techniques, Amitabh Dubey (2002) finds, inter alia, that third-party peacekeeping interventions, including those by the UN, have no significant effect on the duration of peace after civil wars (see also Bailey 2002). In sum, of the six studies reviewed here, three (Wilkenfeld and Brecher 1984; Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996; and Dubey 2002) find peacekeeping to have no effect. Two (Haas 1986 and Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001) find a significant effect, and one (Doyle and Sambanis 2000) finds that only some kinds of peacekeeping are effective. From the existing studies, it is not at all clear whether peacekeeping works in either interstate or civil conflicts.

Nor has an explicit comparison been made between the two types of peacekeeping. The literature on war termination, and especially on the duration of peace after war is bifurcated between studies of interstate wars and those of civil wars.[3] In part, this bifurcation is the result of an appreciation of the differences between the two types of conflict, but it is also driven by our data. It is difficult to compile perfectly comparable data on inter- and intrastate conflicts, but the bifurcation has meant that many assertions about the differences between civil and interstate conflicts have gone untested. Although the present research does not create an integrated data set that allows for direct comparison of the two types of

[2]Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001:205) define a third-party enforcer as "an outside power that sends troops to separate or protect civil war antagonists from one another or at least promises to do so if the security situation calls for such action." This finding is consistent with a related study not of the durability of peace but of war termination and the implementation of peace agreements: In that study, Walter (2001) argues that third-party security guarantees are critical to overcoming the commitment problems inherent in peace processes after civil wars.

[3]On interstate wars, see Wittman (1979), Maoz (1984), Werner (1999), Goemans (2000), and Fortna (2003, forthcoming). On civil wars, see Licklider (1993, 1995), Mason and Fett (1996), and Walter (2001).

conflict, it does assess peacekeeping in both contexts as a preliminary exploration of differences and similarities between them.

Assessing the Impact of Peacekeeping: Selection Effects

How would we know how well peacekeeping works? A quick comparison of whether war resumed after peacekeepers were deployed and when they were not is sobering, but misleading. Of the 115 cases of cease-fires in civil wars examined here, peace breaks down eventually in about 42 percent when belligerents are left to their own devices and in about 39 percent when peacekeepers are present, a statistically indistinguishable difference. Among interstate wars, peacekeepers are more likely to be associated with renewed war than with stable peace. Of forty-eight cease-fires between states, war resumed in almost 53 percent of those with peacekeepers deployed, compared to only 21 percent of those in which belligerents were left to their own devices. In this case, the negative association between peacekeeping and stable peace is statistically significant, $Pr(\chi^2) = 0.045$.

Is it possible that peacekeeping is actually detrimental to peace? A moral hazard argument would suggest that by keeping a lid on violence, peacekeepers remove any incentive for enemies to resolve their conflict. Longstanding peacekeeping missions, like the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), for instance, may have removed any urgency for Turkish and Greek Cypriots to settle their differences, current peace initiatives notwithstanding. However this argument cannot explain the numbers above, for they refer to whether violent conflict has resumed, not whether underlying issues are resolved. The poor showing of peacekeeping is more likely the result of selection bias. Peacekeeping is not applied to cases of war at random like treatments in a laboratory experiment.

If peacekeepers tend to be deployed only to relatively easy cases, in which peace is quite likely to last in any case, then looking just at whether peacekeepers were present and the duration of peace will lead us to overestimate any positive effect on peace. When analysts of peacekeeping argue that the international community should only deploy "when there is peace to keep" and when the parties exhibit "political will" for peace (arguments that have become almost clichés in policy discussions since the mid-1990s), they may help the UN and the international community to avoid embarrassing failures, but if pushed too far, this policy will also ensure the irrelevance of peacekeeping.[4] In contrast, if as is quite plausible, peacekeepers tend to be sent where they are most needed, when peace would otherwise be difficult to keep, this first glance at the cases will underestimate the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Statistics on crime make a good analogy. Crime rates are probably highest in neighborhoods with the most cops on the street, the most programs for troubled youth, and so on, not because police or youth programs cause crime but because they are put in place in response to the likelihood of crime.

Either way, to reach accurate assessments of the international community's effectiveness at maintaining peace, we need to control for the "degree of difficulty" of the various cases, that is, for other factors that affect the stability of peace (see Blechman et al. 1997). If we were assigned the task, like that of an actuary, of assessing the chances for lasting peace in a particular case, what would we want to know? Existing studies of the durability of peace after both civil and interstate wars suggest a number of potentially important factors. These studies have found peace to be more stable after wars that end with a decisive military victory rather than a stalemate or tie (on civil wars, see Licklider 1995; Dubey 2002; on interstate wars,

[4]On the importance of taking selection effects and endogeneity into account in assessing the effectiveness of international regulatory regimes, see Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996).

see Maoz 1984; Stinnett and Diehl 2001; Toft 2003; Fortna forthcoming) and they have found peace that is ushered in with a formal peace treaty may be more stable than an informal truce.

In the context of civil wars, many (Licklider 1995; Kaufmann 1996; Doyle and Sambanis 2000) have argued that identity conflicts are particularly intractable, though there is conflicting evidence on this count (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Dubey 2002; see Walter 2001 on this debate). The issue in dispute is also thought to affect the tractability of interstate conflict with many arguing that territorial issues are particularly salient and difficult to resolve (Hensel 1996; Stinnett and Diehl 2001; see also Huth 2000; Hensel 2000 for literature reviews and summaries of findings). And there is evidence that wars that threaten the very existence of one side are more likely to resume (Fortna forthcoming). Knowing something about the parties' prior history, whether they have fought in the past, might help us predict how difficult it will be to keep peace (see Goertz and Diehl 1992, 1993 on "enduring rivalries") because violent conflict tends to breed further violence or, simply, because a long history of violence is a good indicator of more intractable conflicts. Similarly, the cost of the war just ended may affect the stability of the peace, although here interestingly the evidence suggests different findings for civil and interstate wars. Intrastate wars with high death tolls have been found to be more likely to resume than less deadly conflicts (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Dubey 2002), but the opposite appears to be the case in interstate wars (Werner 1999; Fortna 2003). The duration of war may also affect the duration of peace, either because long wars are another indicator of intractable conflict or, in the other direction, because long wars lead to war weariness that fosters greater desire for peace (see Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Dubey 2002 for conflicting evidence on this point).

We might also expect peace to be easier to maintain in conflicts between just two parties than in more complicated wars among several states or factions. More actors mean more potential "spoilers" of the peace (Stedman 1997). Wars between neighboring states have been found more prone to resumption than those between states separated by greater distances; so in our examination of interstate wars, we should control for contiguity. Given that combatants in civil wars are almost by definition contiguous, this is not a variable in internal conflicts.[5]

Peacekeepers are less likely to be deployed to keep the peace between, and especially within, large powerful states regardless of whether they are permanent members of the Security Council who have veto power over UN missions (Gilligan and Stedman 2001; Fortna 2002). If wars involving such powerful states are more or less likely to resume than others, then we should also control for this factor to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of peacekeeping. Furthermore, because of the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council (that is, the United States, Russia/Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China), we need to control for whether one of these states was directly involved in the war.

Some recent studies have emphasized the effects of changes that take place after a war ends to explain the recurrence of conflict (Werner 1999; but see Fortna 2003). Because these changes typically occur after the point at which decisions to deploy peacekeepers are made, their omission cannot be said to lead to spurious findings. These changes may affect peace but they do not cause peacekeeping. So even though they may be important additional determinants of stability, they are not included here.

[5]One could propose following the contiguity argument, that civil wars ending in partition should be less prone to recurrence than others. However, Sambanis (2000) finds such is not the case in his analysis of partition after ethnic conflicts.

Data and Model

To find out how well peacekeeping works, we therefore need data on civil and interstate wars, whether or not peacekeepers were deployed, how long peace lasted, and on the control variables discussed above. This paper uses two data sets, one of interstate wars, one of civil wars. Both cover wars ending between 1947 and 1997. The former was developed for a study of the effects of cease-fire agreements on the durability of peace (Fortna forthcoming).[6] The latter is adapted from the data put together by Doyle and Sambanis (2000) (hereafter D&S) for their study of peacebuilding.[7]

In each data set, an observation is a spell of peace starting with a cease-fire, that is an end to or break in the fighting, whether or not it represents the final end of the war.[8] Although it is possible that both data sets miss some short-lived cease-fires, this problem is much more likely in the civil war data given the messy nature of internal conflicts, their stop-and-start nature, and the greater difficulty of obtaining good information on civil wars. In either data set, this missing data problem is almost sure to bias our findings away from the conclusion that peacekeeping makes peace last longer because we are much more likely to notice and there is probably better information on cease-fires that failed quickly when peacekeepers were present than when they were absent. Because this problem is likely to be worse for civil wars, a comparison of the effects of peacekeeping is likely to be biased toward the finding that peacekeeping is more effective in interstate wars than in civil wars.

The dependent variable, the *duration of peace*, is the time between the termination of fighting and the start of another war, if any, between the same parties. If no war has resumed, the duration of peace is considered censored (see below) on December 31, 1999.[9] In twenty-one of the forty-eight interstate cases, or just under 44 percent, peace eventually failed with the eruption of another war. Forty-seven of the 115 civil wars, or just over 40 percent, saw another round of fighting. Of those that failed, the shortest civil war cease-fire in the data set was fifty-one days (in Georgia-Abkhazia in 1993), the longest was almost twenty-seven years (the spell of peace in Rwanda between 1964 and 1990). The average time it took a cease-fire to fail was a little over six years. For interstate wars, the shortest cease-fire was sixteen days (in the Turco-Cypriot war in 1974), the longest was the peace between Israel and Lebanon that stretched from1949 through 1982, and the average length of an interstate cease-fire that eventually failed was just over eight years.

Peacekeeping is coded both with dummy variables (any versus none), and by mission type. For the interstate data, peacekeeping comes in two flavors: unarmed observer missions and (lightly) armed or ''traditional'' peacekeeping forces. In the civil war data, a third category captures multidimensional peacekeeping, that is, missions that involved significant civilian components (election monitoring, police training or monitoring, human rights monitoring, and so on). All of these types of peacekeeping are deployed with the consent of the parties themselves, and, if undertaken by the UN, are authorized under Chapter VI of the Charter. Reflecting the prevalence of more forceful missions to keep peace in civil wars in the last decade, the civil war data also include a measure for enforcement missions

[6]Data are available at www.columbia.edu/~vpf4.

[7]These data are available at www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/peacebuilding/index.htm. The D&S data were converted to a time-varying data set by Amitabh Dubey, whom I thank for generously sharing his work as well as for his consultation on numerous cases and coding decisions.

[8]In the interstate data, each dyad of a multilateral war is considered a separate (though not necessarily independent) case.

[9]The time-varying version (see below) of the interstate data is effectively censored on December 31, 1997, because of missing capability data. Note that this affects the India-Pakistan case in which peace failed in 1999 with the fighting in Kargil.

authorized under Chapter VII, but not necessarily requiring the consent of the parties.[10] These measures include peacekeeping conducted by the United Nations, by regional organizations such as NATO and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and by ad hoc coalitions of states.

For reasons discussed below, peacekeeping is coded in two ways: as a time-constant and time-varying covariate. The former notes the most extensive type of peacekeeping deployed for the case and does not vary over the peace spell, whereas the latter records changes in mission type over time or the termination of the mission. So, for example, in the time-varying version, Cambodia is coded as having a traditional peacekeeping mission at first, then a multidimensional peacekeeping mission starting in March 1992, and as having no peacekeeping after the withdrawal of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in September 1993. In the time-constant version, Cambodia is coded simply as having a multidimensional mission.

International personnel were sent to keep the peace in over two-thirds of the interstate cease-fires (34 out of 48), but to only 41 out of the 115 civil war cases examined here. However, 34 of these internal missions took place after 1989 (twelve of which were Chapter VII enforcement missions mostly conducted by actors other than the UN). Because 55 of the 115 civil wars took place after 1989, the proportion of civil wars receiving peacekeeping in the post–Cold War period is much closer to the proportion of interstate wars that have seen peacekeeping in the last fifty years. Because peacekeeping in civil wars has only become common practice since the end of the Cold War, the analysis below examines the post-1989 period as well as the longer period since World War II. Of the interstate peacekeeping missions, 27 were undertaken by the UN and 7 by regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions. Of the missions deployed in intrastate conflicts, the UN sent 30, states or organizations other than the UN sent 23 (12 cases had both UN and non-UN peacekeepers).

In both data sets, a dummy variable marks whether the war ended in a tie or stalemate or in a decisive *military victory*. Another dummy variable marks wars that ended with a formal *peace treaty*.[11] There are two measures of the stakes or issues of the conflict in each data set. In the civil war data set, ethnic, religious, and *identity* conflicts are distinguished from ideological, revolutionary, or other wars. A separate variable denotes *secessionist* wars.[12] In the interstate war data, *territorial* wars are distinguished from wars over other issues; wars that threaten the very *existence* of one side are also noted.[13]

In both the civil and interstate war data sets, the *cost* of war is measured as the natural log of the death toll. Because of the high proportion of noncombatant

[10]Note that enforcement missions are not included in the interstate data on peacekeeping. When the UN has used Chapter VII to authorize action in interstate wars, as in Korea and Iraq, these enforcement missions were war-fighting operations and not intended to keep peace between belligerents.

[11]Note that in the civil war data these are mutually exclusive categories. The outcome of war is coded as victory, informal cease-fire, or peace agreement. As with most quantitative studies of civil war, D&S do not distinguish between the military outcome (victory vs. stalemate) and the political outcome (settlement vs. none). This lack of distinction is problematic for interstate wars, in which it is possible to have both a victory by one side and a peace settlement (for example, after the Yom Kippur War), but is probably less so for civil wars. More problematic is the lack of distinction between the formality of an agreement, if there was one, and whether it was a cease-fire or a political settlement. That is, should a formally signed cease-fire be treated as an "informal truce" or a "peace treaty"? D&S appear to include such cases in their "informal truce" category. To match this distinction, the treaty variable in the interstate data is coded 1 only for peace agreements (defined as those that renounce the use of force or restore diplomatic relations), not for formal cease-fire agreements. The Armistice Agreement ending the Korean War does not qualify as a peace agreement, for example. This variable does not capture the content or strength of any agreement. See Fortna (forthcoming).

[12]The former variable is wartype from the D&S data. The latter, which includes wars of self-determination, is derived from Sambanis and Zinn (2002) with missing data filled in from Kohn (1986) and Brogan (1990).

[13]The former variable (rev_terr) is derived from the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data set's coding of "revision type." The latter is derived from the coding of "gravity of highest value threatened" in the International Crisis Behavior data set (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1992).

deaths in civil conflicts, this measure includes civilian deaths for internal wars. The *duration* of war is measured in months. Dummy variables note whether the war was a *multiparty* conflict involving more than two states or factions. Although reliable data on the relative strengths of rebel and government forces does not exist, the civil war data include a measure of the *government's army size*. A somewhat comparable measure in the interstate data notes the military capabilities of the stronger side.[14] Direct involvement by permanent members of the Security Council either as a primary combatant (Russia in Chechnya or the United States and China in Korea) or as a third-party combatant (the United States in the Dominican Republic or France in Chad) is measured in both data sets with dummy variables. Prior *history of conflict* is measured in the interstate data set as the extent to which the belligerents' shared history before the war was marked by militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Dispute data at the civil war level do not exist, but a rough equivalent marks the extent to which the country's history is marked by wars between the same parties. In both cases, the number of prior disputes or wars is divided by the number of years in which conflict could have been observed; that is, since the start of the relevant data set (MID or D&S) or independence, whichever occurs later. A final control variable in the interstate data marks whether the belligerents are *contiguous*.

Hazard analysis (also known as duration analysis) and, more specifically, a Weibull model[15] is used to test the effects of peacekeeping on the duration of peace. This model estimates the effects of independent variables on the risk, or "hazard" of peace failing in a particular time period, given that peace has lasted up to that time period. It can thus tell us whether the risk of renewed warfare is lower after wars that end in a victory, say, and whether the risk falls when peacekeepers are present or rises when they depart. Duration models are also particularly adept at dealing with censored data. Even though a fragile peace was holding in Liberia when the D&S data were compiled, it has faltered since. The peace, such as it was, between the United States and Iraq after the Gulf War failed after this research was done but before it appeared in print. Even on the Korean peninsula, where peace has lasted for half a century, we cannot be certain that it will continue to last. Duration models can cope with this uncertainty about future outcomes.

In the tables that follow, hazard ratios are reported rather than coefficients that might be more familiar to readers used to linear or logistic regression. Hazard ratios are interpreted relative to one (1.0). A hazard ratio greater than one means that high values of that variable increase the risk of another war (that is, they are associated with peace that fails more quickly); hazard ratios less than one indicate variables that decrease the hazard (that is, are associated with more durable peace). The interpretation of hazard ratios is easiest to see for a dichotomous variable. A hazard ratio of 2 would mean that the variable doubles the risk of another war. A hazard ratio of 0.75 would mean that the variable reduces the risk of another war by 25 percent (from 1 to 0.75).[16]

[14]Capability data is from the Correlates of War capabilities index, measuring a states' share of the interstate system's total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military manpower, and military expenditures.

[15]I use the Weibull distribution rather than some of the other possible duration models because it requires no a priori assumption about whether peace becomes more or less difficult to maintain over time. The Weibull also provides more precise estimates than a proportional hazards model such as the Cox in a small data set such as the one used here (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997:1435). The results do not differ substantially if the less restrictive Cox model is used.

[16]Because not all of the cases in the data are necessarily independent of each other, robust standard errors are calculated with cases clustered by country. The civil war cluster variable is from D&S's clust2. In addition to wars within the same state, it groups together cases within the former Soviet Union as well as those in the former Yugoslavia. The interstate cluster variable groups all of the cases within the Arab-Israeli conflict together, all those between India and Pakistan, and so on.

Findings

Table 1 shows the effects of peacekeeping as well as the control variables (discussed further below) on the duration of peace after interstate wars. Whether treated as a single dummy variable, or broken out by mission type, peacekeeping is associated with more durable peace. The hazard ratio of 0.67 for the peacekeeping dummy in column 1, for example, indicates that the presence of peacekeepers reduces the hazard of another war by over 30 percent. That is, at any given time, the risk of resumed fighting when peacekeepers are present is about 67 percent of the risk if no peacekeepers are deployed. Observer missions are estimated to cut the risk of another war by about 30 percent, traditional peacekeeping missions by about 40 percent, relative to cases in which belligerents are left to their own devices. But the large standard errors mean that these effects are not statistically significant, they could simply be artifacts of the data.

Table 2 shows the effects of peacekeeping after civil wars, both for the full time period and for the post–Cold War period in which the international community has

TABLE 1. Effects on Duration of Interstate Peace, Weibull Regression with Time-Varying Measure of Peacekeeping
(Robust standard errors in parentheses)

	Hazard Ratios	
Peacekeeping	0.672	—
	(0.441)	
Observer Missions	—	0.709
		(0.657)
Traditional Peacekeeping	—	0.618
		(0.681)
Military Victory	0.007***	0.007***
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Peace Treaty	0.120*	0.109
	(0.142)	(0.167)
Territory	0.057*	0.053*
	(0.084)	(0.090)
Existence at Stake	9.749***	8.916**
	(3.669)	(9.059)
Cost of War	1.831	1.865
	(0.833)	(1.048)
Duration of War	0.898*	0.898**
	(0.049)	(0.048)
Multilateral	1.589	1.655
	(1.341)	(1.726)
Power of Stronger Side	1.000	1.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)
P-5 Involvement	0.004***	0.004**
	(0.008)	(0.009)
History of Conflict	2.893***	2.887***
	(0.978)	(1.039)
Contiguous	1.326	1.334
	(0.308)	(0.267)
p	0.922	0.921
	(0.225)	(0.220)
Subjects	48	48
Observations	876	876
Log Likelihood	−44.274	−44.270

Statistical significance: *$p \leq 0.10$; **$p \leq 0.05$; ***$p \leq 0.01$; js: joint significance.

TABLE 2. Effects on Duration of Civil Peace, Weibull Regression with Time-Varying Measure of Peacekeeping
(Robust standard errors in parentheses)

	Hazard Ratios			
	1947–1999		1989–1999	
Chapter VI Peacekeeping	0.295*	—	0.055*	—
	(0.211)		(0.094)	
Observer Missions	—	0.225* js*	—	0.000*** js***
		(0.177)		(0.000)
Traditional PK	—	0.252js*	—	0.065 js***
		(0.259)		(0.125)
Multidimensional PK	—	0.940js*	—	0.158 js***
		(0.654)		(0.192)
Chapter VII Enforcement	2.611	2.642	1.327	1.595
	(1.604)	(1.563)	(1.891)	(2.089)
Military Victory	0.107***	0.102**	0.058	0.059
	(0.093)	(0.098)	(0.103)	(0.106)
Peace Treaty	0.371	0.364	0.071	0.064
	(0.303)	(0.315)	(0.121)	(0.113)
Identity War	1.231	1.243	0.623	0.568
	(0.589)	(0.601)	(0.602)	(0.523)
Secessionist War	0.724	0.725	0.744	0.749
	(0.282)	(0.296)	(0.695)	(0.751)
Cost of War	1.203*	1.204*	1.259	1.208
	(0.134)	(0.136)	(0.300)	(0.280)
Duration of War	0.997	0.996	1.001	1.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Multilateral	1.268	1.230	2.092	2.989
	(0.634)	(0.633)	(2.793)	(4.027)
Government Army Strength	0.9995	0.9995	0.998	0.998
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
P-5 Involvement	0.552	0.567	0.670	0.575
	(0.543)	(0.580)	(0.593)	(0.568)
History of Conflict	0.708	0.736	0.054**	0.043**
	(0.409)	(0.480)	(0.066)	(0.063)
P	0.735**	0.749**	0.844	0.892
	(0.090)	(0.095)	(0.153)	(0.182)
Subjects	112	112	53	53
Observations	257	257	87	87
Log Likelihood	−99.336	−98.801	−40.422	−39.048

Statistical significance: *$p \leqslant 0.10$; **$p \leqslant 0.05$; ***$p \leqslant 0.01$; js: joint significance.

actively attempted to maintain peace in internal conflicts. Over the full time period, the hazard ratio of 0.295 (column 1) means that consent-based peacekeeping (authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter) reduces the hazard of another war by about 70 percent. Breaking these deployments down by mission type (column 2), we can see that all types of consent-based peacekeeping lead to a more durable peace. These effects are jointly significant, but only at a somewhat lax $p \leq .10$ level.[17]

However, Chapter VII enforcement missions are, if anything, associated with peace that falls apart more quickly. The hazard ratios in columns 1 and 2 estimate that peace is over two and a half times more likely to fail when an enforcement

[17]Joint significance is calculated with a χ^2 measure using Stata's "test" command. All indications of statistical significance are based on two-tailed tests.

mission is present than when no peacekeepers are deployed. This effect is not statistically significant, so it should be taken with a grain of salt, but the possible negative effect of enforcement missions on stability is surprising. We might have expected missions with much stronger mandates and the ability to fight if necessary to be more effective than missions constrained by the need to maintain consent and limited in their ability to use force. We may, however, here be seeing the result of remaining selection bias. International intervention of some sort is probably most likely where peace is most precarious, and enforcement missions may be chosen over consent-based missions in the most difficult cases within this subset. The control variables used here may not be sufficient to capture this selection process. But it may also be the case that enforcement missions, which almost by definition make enemies in the war, end up having to fight these enemies again relatively quickly to maintain an imposed peace. This has been the case in Liberia, for example, with the Nigerian-led Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) enforcement mission and Charles Taylor's forces (Adebajo 2002).

Restricting the analysis to only the post–Cold War period (columns 3 and 4 of Table 2), we observe an even larger positive effect for consent-based peacekeeping. The risk of another war drops by almost 95 percent when such a mission is present relative to those in which combatants are left to their own devices. All types of Chapter VI peacekeeping have a very large and jointly statistically significant effect, but the effect of observer missions is most dramatic. There is only one failed observer mission in the post–Cold War period, the first cease-fire in Angola, monitored by the UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II). The detrimental effects of enforcement missions appear less pronounced in the post–Cold War period.

Comparing the results in Tables 1 and 2, it is clear that peacekeeping is no less effective in internal conflicts than between states. In fact, if anything, just the opposite appears to be true. Peacekeepers have had a larger and more clearly significant impact on the risk of another civil war than on the risk of recurrent interstate wars. Such is particularly true in the most recent era of active international involvement to keep peace in internal conflicts.

The results in Tables 1 and 2 use the time-varying measure of peacekeeping described above. This measure arguably underestimates the true influence of peacekeepers. Using this version means peace that continues to hold after peacekeepers leave counts against the hypothesis that peacekeeping has an effect. The model assumes that if a purported cause (peacekeeping) is taken away and the result (peace) still holds, there is evidence that peacekeeping is not the real cause. So peacekeepers are not given any credit for peace lasting after they are gone. But for the UN and other policymakers involved in peacekeeping, true success is not just preventing another war but the ability to go home and still have peace hold—to create a self-sustaining peace. To measure the lasting effects of peacekeepers even after they complete their mission and leave, the time-constant version of the peacekeeping variables should be used. Tables 3 and 4 show the results for interstate and civil wars, respectively. As expected, the effects of peacekeeping on the duration of peace are larger for both types of war when international personnel are given statistical credit for peace that lasts after they depart.

After interstate wars the hazard ratio now drops considerably (indicating a larger effect). The risk of another war when a peacekeeping mission is present is less than 10 percent that of other cases. Observer missions reduce the hazard of war by almost 95 percent, traditional peacekeeping by 65 percent. These effects are now statistically significant at $p \leq .10$ for the dummy variable and jointly at the conventional $p \leq .05$ level when one differentiates between observer missions and lightly armed traditional peacekeeping missions.

The magnitude of peacekeeping effects is also larger for the time-constant version after civil wars, though the difference is only slight when the sample is restricted to the post–Cold War period. Such a result is to be expected as these

TABLE 3. Effects on Duration of Interstate Peace, Weibull Regression with Time-Constant Measure of Peacekeeping
(Robust standard errors in parentheses)

	Hazard Ratios	
Peacekeeping	0.087*	—
	(0.125)	
Observer Missions	—	0.055 js**
		(0.099)
Traditional Peacekeeping	—	0.351 js**
		(0.234)
Military Victory	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Peace Treaty	0.210*	0.308
	(0.193)	(0.278)
Territory	0.050*	0.276
	(0.086)	(0.686)
Existence at Stake	9.871***	31.956***
	(2.327)	(40.773)
Cost of War	1.525	1.245
	(0.651)	(0.753)
Duration of War	0.915**	0.911**
	(0.034)	(0.041)
Multilateral	1.841	0.644
	(1.938)	(0.975)
Power of Stronger Side	0.9996	1.00
	(0.001)	(0.001)
P-5 Involvement	0.003**	0.010
	(0.009)	(0.032)
History of Conflict	4.513***	4.393***
	(2.502)	(2.272)
Contiguous	0.936	1.016
	(0.209)	(0.165)
P	1.062	1.065
	(0.146)	(0.131)
Subjects	48	48
Observations	876	876
Log Likelihood	−41.765	−41.308

Statistical significance: *$p \leq 0.10$; **$p \leq 0.05$; ***$p \leq 0.01$; js: joint significance.

peace spells are censored much closer to the time of the cease-fire (peace can last at most ten years before censoring in this subset of the data). The hazard ratio of 0.242 in column 1 indicates that in the longer time period, the risk of peace failing is over 75 percent lower when a Chapter VI mission has been deployed. In the post–Cold War era, peacekeeping reduces the risk by almost 99 percent.[18] The positive effects on peace of each mission type considered separately are also larger when the time constant measures are used. Note also that in Table 4, enforcement missions in civil wars in the post–Cold War era are no longer associated with peace that falls apart more quickly. The hazard ratios in columns 3 and 4 are less than one, though still not significant.

The difference between the effects of peacekeeping in interstate and civil wars is less stark in Tables 3 and 4 than in Tables 1 and 2. But it is certainly not the case that peacekeepers have been less successful in their more recent attempts to foster

[18]The smaller number of cases in the restricted sample means that the effect of the peacekeeping dummy is not significant.

TABLE 4. Effects on Duration of Civil Peace, Weibull Regression with Time-Constant Measure of Peacekeeping
(Robust standard errors in parentheses)

	Hazard Ratios			
	1947–1999		1989–1999	
Chapter VI Peacekeeping	0.242**	—	0.014	—
	(0.154)		(0.038)	
Observer Missions	—	0.174** js*	—	0.000*** js***
		(0.135)		(0.000)
Traditional PK	—	0.226 js*	—	0.018js***
		(0.239)		(0.053)
Multidimensional PK	—	0.402 js*	—	0.030** js***
		(0.333)		(0.053)
Chapter VII Enforcement	2.200	2.153	0.368	0.387
	(1.207)	(1.208)	(0.424)	(0.383)
Military Victory	0.091***	0.086**	0.017	0.017
	(0.073)	(0.086)	(0.046)	(0.049)
Peace Treaty	0.354	0.342	0.049	0.049
	(0.262)	(0.308)	(0.110)	(0.108)
Identity War	1.333	1.322	0.972	0.948
	(0.646)	(0.644)	(0.880)	(0.811)
Secessionist War	0.687	0.702	0.392	0.401
	(0.275)	(0.288)	(0.346)	(0.427)
Cost of War	1.210*	1.217*	1.283	1.251
	(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.210)	(0.202)
Duration of War	0.997	0.996	0.998	0.9996
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Multilateral	1.249	1.218	4.460	6.607
	(0.617)	(0.611)	(8.730)	(11.878)
Government Army Strength	0.999	0.999	0.998	0.998
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
P-5 Involvement	0.561	0.571	0.635	0.514
	(0.541)	(0.579)	(0.630)	(0.606)
History of Conflict	0.778	0.797	0.039*	0.033*
	(0.445)	(0.515)	(0.071)	(0.065)
P	0.740**	0.746**	1.029*	1.093
	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.328)	(0.368)
Subjects	112	112	53	53
Observations	257	257	87	87
Log Likelihood	−98.842	−98.682	−37.790	−36.487

Statistical significance: *$p \leqslant 0.10$; **$p \leqslant 0.05$; ***$p \leqslant 0.01$; js: joint significance.

durable peace among belligerents in internal conflicts than in their more traditional role keeping peace between sovereign states. In the post–Cold War period in which most peacekeeping in civil wars has taken place, these missions have had at least as large an impact as has peacekeeping between states. There is no evidence for the conventional wisdom that the task of keeping peace after civil wars is much harder than after interstate wars.

Tables 1 through 4 also shed light on the control factors hypothesized to affect the duration of peace. In all of these tests, wars that end in a decisive military victory yield more stable peace. The risk of another war after a decisive military outcome is only about 10 percent that of wars that end without a clear winner and loser. This effect is not statistically significant for civil wars in the post–Cold War period, but this result is most likely due to the smaller number of cases rather than a reduction in the effect of this factor over time; the magnitude of the estimated effect is, if anything, larger. The existence of a peace settlement (defined simply as

an agreement that restores relations or explicitly renounces the use of force) is also associated with a lower risk of future conflict, though in many tests, not significantly so. Civil wars fought over ethnicity or identity are slightly more prone to resumption over the full time period, but are less prone to recurrence in the 1989–1999 period. In neither case is there a significant difference and this flip-flopping of the direction of the effects suggests that this finding is simply an artifact of our data. Surprisingly, secessionist wars are associated with a lower risk of resumption, but again, there is no statistically significant effect. The findings for interstate wars show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, territorial conflicts are, if anything, less prone to resumption rather than more. Wars in which one side's very existence is at stake, however, are more likely to resume.

In all four tables, the effect of the cost of war is to increase the hazard of another round of fighting. Although not statistically significant, this result is noteworthy as it contradicts findings for interstate wars in previous studies (Werner 1999; Fortna 2003). Civil and interstate wars are more alike in this regard than previous research has shown. However, longer wars end with more stable peace, significantly so for interstate conflicts. This finding supports the war weariness hypotheses, although the weaker effect of this variable for civil wars suggests that the animosity built up over long wars may offset this effect when former belligerents have to live together in the same country.

Complicated wars among many parties are associated with a higher risk of another war, but this effect flips in Table 3 and is never statistically significant. Neither the capabilities of the stronger side in interstate wars nor the size of the government's army in civil wars has any discernable effect on the duration of peace. The hazard ratios are extremely close to one, indicating no effect. In the past half-century (though arguably not over a longer historical sweep), wars involving a great power, that is, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, have been unlikely to re-erupt. This effect is much smaller (and not significant) for civil wars, however.

States whose prior history is marked by frequent militarized disputes are significantly more likely to fight again than those with less conflictual histories, but surprisingly this finding does not hold up for civil wars. In fact, if anything, just the opposite is true of belligerents in internal wars. The measures of prior histories of conflict are somewhat different in the two data sets because there is no equivalent of the Militarized Interstate Dispute data for civil wars, so this difference between the two types of conflict may simply be a matter of measurement error, but it deserves further research.

The value of *P*, noted toward the bottom of Tables 1 through 4, indicates the shape of the hazard function. That is, it tells us whether peace tends to get more precarious over time or whether it becomes consolidated, with peace less likely to fall apart the longer it has lasted. As with hazard ratios, *P* is judged in relation to a value of one, which would indicate a flat hazard (a constant risk over time). In most of the models here, particularly when *P* is statistically significant, it is less than one. This result suggests that peace is most precarious when it is new, but that the risk of another war is reduced as time passes. However, the fact that *P* is slightly greater than one in Table 3 and in the post–Cold War period in Table 4 means that we should treat this finding with caution.

For most of the control variables, the effects on civil and interstate wars are much the same. The process governing the durability of peace appears to be marked by more similarity than difference in the two contexts.

Conclusion

In general, peace lasts longer when peacekeepers are present than when belligerents are left to their own devices. In other words, peacekeeping works.

Once we take into account the fact that peacekeepers are not deployed to cases at random, and particularly if we use a model that gives peacekeepers credit for peace that lasts even after they depart, analysis of both interstate and civil wars over the past half-century shows the positive effects of international peacekeeping on the duration of peace. The civil war data show, however, more surprisingly, that Chapter VII enforcement missions have not been as effective at maintaining peace and may even be detrimental to stable peace, although the possibility that selection effects remain unaccounted for should make us cautious about such a conclusion.

The comparison made here between peacekeeping in civil and interstate wars is preliminary. The two data sets examined here and the various control variables are not fully comparable. Nonetheless, the results discussed above indicate that very similar processes affect whether civil and interstate wars will resume. Our theories about one are much more applicable to the other than the bifurcated nature of their study would suggest. The findings in this paper also cast significant doubt on the conventional wisdom about peacekeeping. The international community has adapted the tool of peacekeeping for use in internal conflicts. Contrary to the standard characterization of this endeavor as much less successful than traditional peacekeeping between sovereign states, the record of peacekeeping in civil wars is at least as good as that for interstate wars. In short, peacekeeping is no less effective at maintaining peace between belligerents within states than between belligerents who are both states. It is at least as effective inside as out.

Even though a definitive comparison must await better data on both types of conflict, this finding warrants optimism. Given that civil wars are much more prevalent than interstate wars, the international community is increasingly called on to help maintain peace in war-torn societies. Peacekeeping is no panacea of course, but it does improve the chances for peace between states and, especially, within them.

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