

# COLLOQUIUM ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Political Science GR8804

Fall 2019, Thursdays 10:10 am - 12:00 pm, 711 International Affairs Building

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Office Hours: Wednesday 4:00-6:00 pm or by appointment  
Exception: Week 11 hours on Monday, 11/11, 4:00-6:00 pm  
Sign up for office hours at: [www.wejoinin.com/N.Gaikwad](http://www.wejoinin.com/N.Gaikwad)

## Course Description

This is a survey course in international political economy. This course examines how domestic and international politics influence the economic relations between states. It will address the major theoretical debates in the field and introduce the chief methodological approaches used in contemporary analyses. We will focus attention on different types of cross-border flows and the policies and international institutions that regulate them: the flow of goods (trade policy), the flow of people (immigration policy), the flow and location of production (foreign investment policy), the flow of capital (financial and exchange rate policy), and the flow of pollution (environment policy). The goal of this course is to cover, in some depth, many of the main topics and readings in international political economy. The readings each week are designed to tackle some of the essential points of a substantive topic, as well as raise deeper methodological questions that have application to other issues and themes in the sub-field. Not coincidentally, a related goal is to partially prepare students for the IR Field Exam. To help with that, a number of recommended readings accompany each week's topic.

## Assignments and Grading

### 1. Participation (20%):

The principal requirement for students is to read thoroughly each of the assigned required readings for the week, and to come to seminar prepared to discuss the readings and to participate in the classroom. In particular, each week students should be prepared to:

- Critically examine the set of arguments,
- Appraise controversies in the literature,
- Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the research designs employed, and
- Identify and propose new research projects that build on the literature.

### 2. Critical Reviews (30%):

Students are required to choose **three** weeks to write short critical reviews. The reviews, limited to **two single-spaced pages**, should focus on two or three articles on a specific topic (articles should be from either the required or further reading list on the syllabus for a given topic), highlighting the contribution and critically evaluating the work. While papers may begin with a

(very) short summary of the readings, the main task of the paper is analysis. Focus on what you see as the strengths and weaknesses of the theory or research design; the possible intersections among the readings; and—perhaps most importantly—what theoretical issues and empirical questions for future research are raised by the readings and/or that can correct and extend the summarized work.

Each paper should be uploaded to CourseWorks in the “Assignment” folder for the respective week by **Tuesday at 8 pm** prior to class. You may write responses for any of the substantive weeks during the course. To evenly distribute papers across weeks, we will divide up papers and weeks during the first class session. (No papers written for Week 1 and 13).

### 3. Discussion Leaders (15%):

While all students are expected to come to class prepared to discuss the readings, we will also have one or two official “discussion leaders” each week. Each student will be a discussion leader **twice** during the semester and should pick weeks that are different from the weeks when they submit critical reviews. The discussion leader will start that week’s class with a set of comments. There is no need to summarize extensively the readings or response papers, as everyone in the class will have received them. Rather, during the discussion you are expected to compare and contrast the arguments and evidence presented, introduce other sources and points of view, and provide your own insights. Discussion leaders’ comments are to serve as a springboard for the broader seminar discussion. Again, discussion leader duties will be assigned during the first week of the seminar.

### 4. Final Exam / Research Paper (35%):

In addition to regular participation, the critical reviews, and discussion leader duties, each student must select one of two options for fulfilling the remaining course requirements:

- *Option 1 (highly recommended):* Take home final exam. The closed book, written final will be in the format of the IR Field Exam, but shorter and only focused on IPE. Students will have the option of answering two out of three essay questions. The exam will be distributed to students on the morning of **Friday, December 13**, and must be completed within a four hour period on that day.
- *Option 2:* Research paper. Students selecting this option should write one 20-35 page paper that presents original research. The paper should be completed by **Friday, December 20**. Students who choose this option should meet with the instructor to discuss their topic by early-October and submit a two to three-page outline by mid-October. They should also be prepared to present an overview of their paper to the rest of the class on **Thursday, December 5** in order to collect feedback and suggestions for improvement. One particularly effective strategy for this paper is a replication and extension of previously published research. This option is much more time consuming and difficult than Option 1 and is offered only for students who want to publish research in international political economy (mostly PhD political science students). Otherwise, the exam is highly recommended.

## Students with Disabilities

Students who may need an academic accommodation based on the impact of a disability must initiate the request with the Disability Services (DS) center at Columbia Health. DS staff will evaluate the request with required documentation, recommend reasonable accommodations, and prepare an Accommodation Letter for faculty dated in the current semester in which the request is being made.

Students should contact DS as soon as possible since timely notice is needed to coordinate accommodations. The DS center is located at Wien Hall, Suite 108A, 411 W 116th St, Mail Code 3714, New York, NY 10027 (phone: 212-854-2388 Voice/TTY).

## Readings and Schedule

### Week 1 (September 5): Introduction

Required:

- Frieden, Jeffrey A., & Lisa Martin. 2002. "International Political Economy: The State of the Sub-Discipline." In Katznelson, Ira, & Helen Milner. eds. *Political Science: The State of the Discipline III*. New York, NY: Norton, pp. 118–146.
- Cohen, Benjamin J. (2008) *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1.
- Rodrik, Dani. 1996. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy." In Grossman, Elhanan, & Kenneth Rogoff. eds. *Handbook of International Economics*. Vol. 3. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, pp. 1457–1494.

### Week 2 (September 12): International Context, Geopolitics, and Trade Policy

Required:

- Krasner, Stephen. 1976. "State Power and the Structure of International Trade." *World Politics* 28(3): 317–347.
- Gowa, Joanne, & Edward Mansfield. 1993. "Power Politics and International Trade." *American Political Science Review* 87(2): 408–420.
- Kindleberger, Charles P. 1986. *The World in Depression 1929–1939*. Revised and enlarged edition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 288–305.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters Chapters 1, 5-7.

Selected Further Reading:

- Berger, Daniel, William Easterly, Nathan Nunn, & Shanker Satyanath. 2013. "Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade During the Cold War." *American Economic Review* 103(2):863–96.
- Gowa, Joanne. 1995. *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mansfield, Edward. 1994. *Power, Trade, and War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Carnegie, Allison, & Nikhar Gaikwad. 2017. "Public Opinion on Geopolitics and Trade: Theory and Evidence." Working Paper.
- Davis, Christina, & Sophie Meunier. 2011. "Business as Usual? Economic Responses to Political Tensions." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3):628–646.

- Gowa, Joanne. 1989. “Bipolarity, multipolarity, and free trade.” *American Political Science Review*
- Kindleberger, Charles P. 1975. “The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820–1875.” *Journal of Economic History* 35(1): 20–55.
- Hirschman, Albert. 1945. *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane. 1993. “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework.” In *Ideas and Foreign Policy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Morrison, James. “Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization.” *International Organization* 66(3): 395–428.

### Week 3 (September 19): Societal Coalition Models of Trade Policymaking

Required:

- Scheve, Kenneth, & Matthew Slaughter. 2001. “What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?” *Journal of International Economics* 54(2): 267–292.
- Mayda, Anna, & Dani Rodrik. 2005. “Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?” *European Economic Review* 49(6): 1393–1430.
- Hainmueller, Jens, & Michael Hiscox. 2006. “Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade.” *International Organization* 60(2): 469–498.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. “Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Voting, and Out-Group Anxiety.” *International Organization* 63 (3): 425–457.

Selected Further Reading:

- Mayer, Wolfgang. 1984. “Endogenous Tariff Formation.” *American Economic Review* 74(5): 970–985.
- Baker, Andy. 2005. “Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs.” *American Journal of Political Science* 49(4): 924–938.
- Fordham, Benjamin O., & Katja B. Kleinberg. 2012. “How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade?” *International Organization* 66(2): 311–328.
- Guisinger, Alexandra. 2009. “Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?” *International Organization* 63 (3): 533–557.
- Lu, Xiaobo, Kenneth Scheve, & Matthew J. Slaughter. 2012. “Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection.” *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3):638–654.
- Milner, Helen V., & Dustin H. Tingley. 2011. “Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy.” *International Organization* 65(1): 37–68.
- Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to International Trade.” *American Political Science Review* 81:1121–1137.

- Verdier, Daniel. 1994. *Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France, and the United States, 1860–1990*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Autor, David, David Dornz, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi. 2016. “Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure.” NBER Working Paper No. 22637.

## Week 4 (September 26): Special Interest Models of Trade Policymaking

Required:

- Grossman, Gene M., & Elhanan Helpman. 1994. “Protection for Sale.” *American Economic Review* 84(4): 833–850.
- Goldberg, Pinelopi K., & Giovanni Maggi. 1999. “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation.” *American Economic Review* 89(5): 1135–55.
- Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. “Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation.” *American Political Science Review* 96(3): 593–608.
- Kim, In Song. Forthcoming. “Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization.” *American Political Science Review*.

Selected Further Reading:

- Ladewig, Jeffrey W. 2006. “Domestic Influences on International Trade Policy: Factor Mobility in the United States, 1963 to 1992.” *International Organization* 60(1): 69–103.
- Baldwin, Robert E., & Christopher Magee. 2000. “Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills.” *Public Choice* 105(1-2): 79–101.
- Bailey, Michael. 2001. “Quiet Influence: The Representation of Diffuse Interests on Trade Policy, 1983–94.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26(1): 45–80.
- Gawande, Kishore, & Bandyopadhyay Usree. 2000. “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection.” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 82(1): 139–52.
- Ballard-Rosa, Cameron, Allison Carnegie, & Nikhar Gaikwad. Forthcoming. “Economic Crises and Trade Policy Competition.” *British Journal of Political Science*
- Bombardini, Matilde, and Francesco Trebbi. 2012. “Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy?” *Journal of International Economics* 87(1):18–26.
- Kim, In Song, Iain Osgood, Dustin Tingley, Thomas Bernauer, Helen Milner, and Gabrielle Spilker. Forthcoming. “The Charmed Life of Superstar Exporters: Firms and Trade Policy in Costa Rica.” *Journal of Politics*
- Milner, Helen. 1987. “Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States during the 1970s.” *International Organization* 41(4): 639–65.
- Mitra, Devashish. 1999. “Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination.” *American Economic Review* 89(5): 1116–34.

- Schattschneider, E.E. 1935. "The Political Behavior of Pressure Groups." *Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff*. pp. 103-162.

## **Week 5 (October 3): Domestic Institutions and Trade Policymaking**

Required:

- Alt, James E., & Michael Gilligan. 1994. "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2(2): 165–192.
- Bailey, Michael, Judith Goldstein, & Barry R. Weingast. 1997. "The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade." *World Politics* 49(3): 309–338.
- Hiscox, Michael J. 1999. "The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization." *International Organization* 53(4): 669–698.
- Milner, Helen, & Keiko Kubota. 2005. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries." *International Organization* 59(1): 707–43.

Selected Further Reading:

- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, & B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade." *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 305–321.
- Putnam, Robert. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42(3): 427–460.
- Irwin, Douglas A., & Randall S. Kroszner. 1999. "Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley." *Journal of Law and Economics* 42(2): 643–673.
- Mansfield, Edward D., & Marc L. Busch. 1995. "The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis." *International Organization* 49(4): 723–749.
- Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions." *International Organization* 41(2):203-223.
- Goldstein, Judith, and Robert Gulotty. 2014. "American and Trade Liberalization: The Limits of Institutional Reform" *International Organization* 68(2):263–295.
- Park, Jong Hee, & Nathan Jensen. 2007. "Electoral Competition and Agricultural Support in OECD Countries." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2):314–329.

## **Week 6 (October 10): International Institutions and Trade Policymaking**

Required:

- Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger. 2010. "The World Trade Organization: Theory and Practice." *Annual Review of Economics* 2:223–56.
- Rose, Andrew K. 2004. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?" *The American Economic Review* 94(1): 98-114.

- Tomz, Michael, Judith L. Goldstein, & Douglas Rivers. 2007. “Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment.” *American Economic Review* 97(5): 2005–2018.
- Rose, Andrew K. 2007. “Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Reply.” *American Economic Review* 97(5): 2019–2025.

Selected Further Reading:

- Carnegie, Allison. 2014. “States Held Hostage: Political Hold-up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions.” *American Political Science Review* 108(1):54-70.
- Bagwell, Kyle, & Robert W. Staiger. 1999. “An Economic Theory of GATT.” *American Economic Review* 89(1): 215–248.
- Davis, Christina. 2004. “International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization.” *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 153–69.
- Davis, Christina. 2012. *Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Carnegie, Allison. 2015. *Power Plays: How International Institutions Reshape Coercive Diplomacy* New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gowa, Joanne, & Soo Yeon Kim. 2005. “An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950-94.” *World Politics* 57(4): 453–78.
- Milgrom, Paul R., and Douglass C. North. 1990. “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs.” *Economics & Politics* 2(1):1–23.
- Barnett, Michael N., & Martha Finnemore. 1999. “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations.” *International Organization* 53(4): 699–732.
- Rosendorff, B. Peter, & Helen V. Milner. 2001. “The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape.” *International Organization* 55(4): 829–857.
- Rosendorff, Peter. 2005. “Stability and Rigidity: Politics and the Design of the WTO’s Dispute Resolution Procedure.” *American Political Science Review* 99(3):389–400.

## Week 7 (October 17): The Political Economy of Migration Policy

Required:

- Scheve, Kenneth F., & Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. “Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy.” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 83(1): 133–45.
- Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael Hiscox. 2010. “Attitudes toward Highly-Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment.” *American Political Science Review* 104(1):61–84.
- Malhotra, Neal, Yotam Margalit, and Cecilla Hyunjung Mo. 2013. “Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact.” *American Journal of Political Science* 57(2):391-410.

- Gaikwad, Nikhar, and Gareth Nellis. 2017. “The Majority-Minority Divide in Attitudes toward Internal Migration: Evidence from Mumbai.” *American Journal of Political Science* 61(2): 456–472.

Selected Further Reading:

- Benhabib, Jess. 1996. “On the Political Economy of Immigration.” *European Economic Review* 40(9): 1737–1743.
- Facchini, Giovanni & Anna Mayda. 2009. “Does the Welfare State Affect Individual Attitudes Toward Immigrants? Evidence Across Countries.” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 91(2): 295–314.
- Hanson, Gordon, Kenneth F. Scheve, & Matthew J. Slaughter. 2007. “Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies.” *Economics and Politics* 19(1): 1–33.
- Mayda, Anna M. 2006. “Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants.” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 88(3): 510–530.
- Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel Hopkins. 2014. “Public Attitudes Toward Immigration.” *Annual Review of Political Science*.
- Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael Hiscox. 2007. “Educated Preferences: Explaining Individual Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe.” *International Organization*.
- Donnelly, Michael, and Rafaela Dancygier. 2013. “Sectoral Economies, Economic Context, and Attitudes Toward Immigration.” *Journal of Politics* 75(1):17–35.
- Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel Hopkins. 2015. “The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes Toward Immigrants.” *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Dancygier, Rafaela. 2010. *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hainmueller, Jens, and D. Hangartner. 2013. “Who Gets a Swiss Passport? A Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimination.” *American Political Science Review*.
- Peters, Margaret E. 2014. “Trade, Foreign Direct Investment and Immigration Policy Making in the US.” *International Organization*.
- Rudolph, Christopher. 2003. “Security and the Political Economy of International Migration.” *American Political Science Review* 97(4): 603–620.

## Week 8 (October 24): The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment

Required:

- Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1994. “International Investment and Colonial Control: A New Interpretation.” *International Organization* 48(4):559–593.
- Johns, Leslie, and Rachel Wellhausen. 2015. “Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment.” *American Political Science Review*.
- Pandya, Sonal. 2014. “Democratization and FDI Liberalization, 1970–2000.” *International Studies Quarterly*.



- Malesky, Edmund, Dimitar Georguiev, and Nathan Jensen. Forthcoming. “Monopopoly Money: Foreign Investment and Bribery in Vietnam, a Survey Experiment.” *American Journal of Political Science*.

Selected Further Reading:

- Jensen, Nathan. 2003. “Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Infows of Foreign Direct Investment.” *International Organization* 57(3): 587–616.
- Henisz, Witold J. 2000. “The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment.” *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 16(2): 334–364.
- Li, Quan. 2009. “Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment.” *Comparative Political Studies* 42(8):1098–1127.
- Buthe, Tim, and Helen Milner. 2008. “The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?” *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4):741–62.
- Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, & Beth A. Simmons. 2006. “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000.” *International Organization* 60(4): 811–846.
- Jandhyala, Srividya, Witold J. Henisz, & Edward D. Mansfield. 2011. “Three Waves of BITs: The Global Diffusion of Foreign Investment Policy.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(6):1047–73.
- Malesky, Edmund. 2008. “Straight Ahead on Red: How Foreign Direct Investment Empowers Subnational Leaders.” *Journal of Politics* 70(1)97-119.
- Owen, Erica. 2015. “The Political Power of Organized Labor and the Politics of Foreign Direct Investment in Developed Democracies.” *Comparative Political Studies*.
- Pandya, Sonal. 2010. “Labor Markets and Demand for Foreign Direct Investment.” *International Organization* 64(3): 389–409.
- Tobin, Jennifer L. & Marc L. Busch. 2010. “A BIT is Better Than a Lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements.” *World Politics* 62(1): 1–42.

## **Week 9 (October 31): The Political Economy of Finance, Money and Debt**

Required:

- Eichengreen, Barry. 1998. *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System*. Princeton University Press. pp. 3-34.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1991. “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance.” *International Organization* 45(4): 425–451.
- Simmons, Beth. 1994. *Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Introduction, and Chapters 3–4.
- Tomz, Michael. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chapters 1 & 2.

### Selected Further Reading:

- Stasavage, David. 2007. "Cities, Constitutions, and Sovereign Borrowing in Europe, 1274–1785." *International Organization* 61(3): 489–525.
- Broz, J. Lawrence, & Jeffrey A. Frieden. 2001. "The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 317–343.
- Simmons, Beth A., & Zachary Elkins. 2004. "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 171–189.
- Chwieroth, Jeffrey. 2007. "Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets." *International Organization* 61(2): 443–463.
- Ruggie, John G. 1982. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." *International Organization* 36(2): 379–415.
- Milner, Helen V., & Bumba Mukherjee. 2009. "Democratization and Economic Globalization." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 163–181.
- Bernhard, William, & David Leblang. 1999. "Democratic Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments." *International Organization* 53(1): 71–97.
- Clark, William R., & Mark Hallerberg. 2000. "Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy." *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 323–46.
- Bechtel, Michael M., Jens Hainmueller, & Yotam M. Margalit. 2014. "Preferences for International Redistribution: The Divide Over the Eurozone Bailouts." *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Stasavage, David. 2003. *Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ballard-Rosa, Cameron. Forthcoming. "Hungary for Change: Urban Bias and Autocratic Sovereign Debt Default." *International Organization*

### Week 10 (November 7): The Political Economy of the Environment

#### Required:

- Barrett, Scott. 2003. *Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Policy Making* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press): 49–84.
- Bechtel, Michael, & Kenneth Scheve. 2013. "Mass Support for Global Climate Agreements Depends on Institutional Design." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Volume* 110 No. 34: 13763–13768.
- Tingley, Dustin, & Michael Tomz. 2014. "Conditional Cooperation and Climate Change." *Comparative Political Studies Volume* 47 Issue 3:344–368.
- Alkon, Meir & Erik Wang. 2017. "Pollution Lowers Support for China's Regime: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Beijing." Forthcoming. *Journal of Politics*.

Selected Further Reading:

- Wapner, Paul. 1995. "Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics." *World Politics* 47(3): 311–340.
- Bernauer, Thomas. 2013. "Climate Change Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 16:421-448.
- Sprinz, Detlef, & Tapani Vaahoranta. 1994. "The Interest-Based Explanation of International Environmental Policy." *International Organization* 48(1): 77–105.
- Battig, Michele, & Thomas Bernauer. 2009. "National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy?" *International Organization* 63(2): 281–308.
- Haas, Peter M. 1992. "Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone." *International Organization* 43 (Summer): 377–403.
- Mitchell, Ronald. 1994. "Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance." *International Organization* 48 (Summer): 425–458.
- Barrett, Scott. 2003. *Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Policy Making*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

**Week 11 (November 14): Globalization and Domestic Politics**

Required:

- Rodrik, Dani (1998). "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?" *Journal of Political Economy* 106 (1998), 997-1032.
- Iversen, Torben, and Thomas R. Cusack (2000). "The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization?" *World Politics*, Volume 52, Number 3, April 2000, pp. 313-349.
- Adsera, Alicia and Carles Boix (2002). "Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness." *International Organization* 56: 229-262.
- Margalit, Yotam (2011). "Costly Jobs: Trade-related layoffs, government compensation and voting in the U.S.." *American Political Science Review* 105 (1), 166-18.

Selected Further Reading:

- Wibbels, Erik (2006). "Dependency Revisited: International Markets, Business Cycles, and Social Spending in the Developing World." *International Organization* 60: 433-468.
- Garrett, Geoffrey (1998). *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2: Politics, Policy, and Performance.
- Rodrik, Dani (1997). *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* Washington: Institute for International Economics. Chapters 2 and 4.
- Mosley, Layna, Brian Greenhill, and Aseem Prakash. 2009. "Trade-Based Diffusion of Labor Rights: A Panel Study, 1986-2002." *American Political Science Review* 103(4):669-690.

- Mosley, Layna, & Saika Uno. 2007. “Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top? Economic Globalization and Collective Labor Rights.” *Comparative Political Studies*. 40(8): 923–948.
- Mosley, Layna. 2008. “Workers’ Rights in Open Economies: Global Production and Domestic Institutions in the Developing World.” *Comparative Political Studies*.
- David Vogel. 2008. “Private Global Business Regulation.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11:261–282.

## Week 12 (November 21): Development and Growth

Required:

- North, Douglass, and Barry Weingast (1989). “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” *Journal of Economic History* 49 (December 1989): 803-832.
- Engerman, Stanley, and Kenneth Sokoloff (2000). “History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments and Paths of Development in the NewWorld.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14 (3): 217-232.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (2001). “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” *American Economic Review*, 91(5):1369-1401.
- Pranab Bardhan. 2005. “History, Institutions and Underdevelopment.” in Bardhan, *Scarcity, Conflicts and Cooperation: Essays in the Political and Institutional Economics of Development*. MIT Press. pp.1–26.

Selected Further Reading:

- LaPorta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer. 2007. “The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins.” NBER Working Paper No. 13608.
- Rodrik, Dani (2007). ‘*One Economics, Many Recipes.*’ Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Part A (pp. 13-98) and Chapter 8.
- Sachs, Jeffrey D. and A. Warner (1995). “Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration.” *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 1995(1): 1-118.
- Wacziarg, Romain and Karen Horn Welch (2008). “Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence.” *The World Bank Economic Review* 2008 22 (2): 187-231.
- Gaikwad, Nikhar. 2017. “East India Companies and Long-Term Economic Change in India.” Working Paper.
- Alesina, Alberto, & Rodrik, Dani. 1994. “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 109(2): 465–90

**November 28 (University Holiday): NO CLASS**

### **Week 13 (December 5): Student Presentations/Recent Developments in IPE**

Students who select to write research papers for the class will present an overview of their papers to the rest of the class in order to collect feedback and suggestions for improvement. The rest of the class will select working papers from the IPES 2019 conference program to present and discuss in class.