My research combines an interpretation of political thought inspired by Machiavelli, grounded on the material organization of power, and normative political theory, guided by a radical republican critique of procedural theories of justice. By focusing on the relation between inequality, corruption, and domination, my work is an economically engaged political philosophy that examines issues of political legitimacy and authority within different conceptions of liberty and the organizations of power they promote.
I specialize on anti-oligarchic, plebeian constitutional models in the history of ideas, and on populism as an electoral type of plebeian politics that appeals to the people-as-plebs and springs from the politicization of inequality. My dissertation Assembling the Plebeian Republic. Popular Institutions against Systemic Corruption & Oligarchic Domination is under review at Princeton University Press.
I am able to teach across the political theory and philosophy canon, offering an interpretation based on a materialist and institutionalist approach to relations of power and the political ideas they generate.