INTRODUCTION

This course will prepare advanced doctoral students in political science and economics who have completed their basic formal and quantitative training for theoretical research in political economy. Substantively, the course will focus on a number of broad institutional questions areas of interest within the field, ranging from elections and legislatures to the bureaucracy and international organizations. The topics should be of clear relevance for graduate students in American politics, comparative politics, political economy and public economics, and should complement well the other courses available in those four fields.

The course will be conducted primarily in lecture format. For each topic in the syllabus, we will focus on a small number of relatively recent articles and working papers. Students will also present on topics related to their own research.

LOGISTICS

Classes will meet on Thursday, 2:10 to 4, at 711 IAB. Office hours are Tuesday 2-4 (Ting) and Tuesday 10-12 (Morelli), and by appointment. Our contact information:

Morelli: 720 IAB, mm3331@columbia.edu, 212 854 5941
Ting: 701 IAB, mmt2033@columbia.edu, 212 854 7945

REQUIREMENTS

Students are expected to have completed an advanced course in game theory (at the level of Political Science W4210) as a prerequisite for enrollment.

Students will be evaluated on the basis of the following:

• Presentation of and written progress towards a publishable research paper (60%)
• Presentation of one article from the syllabus related to your paper (20%)
• One short assignment (20%)

The presentations and paper are parts of a single project, which will proceed as follows. By January 30 each student will inform the instructors of a general topic area of interest. During the semester, the student will present an article or working paper that is closely related to this topic. This article must be approved by the instructors, and we encourage articles that are not listed on this syllabus. In addition to summarizing the article, the presentation will discuss ideas about how to improve upon the model. Presentations are expected to take 40 minutes and will be scheduled on the dates of lectures on related topics.
The paper should identify an interesting question and show that the attempted answer is both sensible and feasible. For example, if a research paper involves mainly theoretical modeling, it should at least contain the proposed model to study the problem and some examples to show that the model can yield interesting results, even if the full-blown theorems are yet to be proved. The topic of the paper should be discussed with the instructor. Students will present the preliminary model in class during the final weeks of the semester. The paper is due May 1.

The short assignment will ask a number of questions related to articles covered in class. It is due March 27.

Links to all articles and working papers, as well as updates to this syllabus, may be found on the course’s CourseWorks page.

READING LIST

Following is a list of topics that we plan to cover during the semester. Each topic will receive 1-2 weeks. The order of topics and the number of papers we cover will be determined by student (and instructor) interest. Papers marked by a (*) will tentatively be covered in class. Students should inform the instructors if there are papers that they are particularly interested in seeing, or that have been covered previously in another course.

- Voting

- Electoral Competition

- Electoral Systems


- **Parties**
  


- **Parliamentary Systems**
  


- **Campaigns**
  


- Lobbying

- Legislative Careers

- Reelection

- Regimes


Bureaucracy


Direct Democracy


Dynamic Political Economy


Power, and Incumbency Advantage.” Unpublished manuscript, Harvard University.
Economic Cycles.” Unpublished manuscript, Columbia University.

• International Organizations
nomics 120(4): 1535-1568.
Maggi, Giovanni. 2013. “International Trade Agreements.” The Handbook of Inter-
national Economics, Volume 4, forthcoming. (Text on Courseworks site.)
Maggi, Giovanni, and Massimo Morelli. 2006. “Self-Enforcing Voting in International
Maggi, Giovanni, and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare. 2007. “A Political-Economy Theory
Stasavage, David. 2004. “Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and

• Norms and Identity
Bénabou, Roland, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni. 2013. “Forbidden Fruits:
The Political Economy of Science, Religion, and Growth.” Unpublished manuscript,
Princeton University.
Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2006. “Incentives and Prosocial Behavior.” American
Levy, Gilat, and Ronny Razin. 2012. “Religious Beliefs, Religious Participation, and
Unpublished manuscript, Bocconi University.