The purpose of this course is to delve into how states infer what others are likely to do in the future and how they try to project desired images of how they will behave. This involves both purposeful or intended communication, as in diplomacy, and the ways in which perceivers try to discern others' capabilities and intentions from attributes and behaviors that the senders cannot readily manipulate.

Students will discuss the assigned reading and write a 25-page paper on a topic and case of their own choosing. A 3-page prospectus is due on February 7 and the paper is due the last day of class.

I. Sending and Receiving Signals

1-2. Introduction: International Politics as Poker or Rashomon?

3. Problems of Timing and Fear of Looking Weak
Pages and notes on reserve.
Henry Kissinger, White House Years, ch. XVIII (opening to China).

4. Signaling
Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Politics.

5. Credible Signals and Audience Costs
James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,"

6. Beliefs and Threat Perception
Jervis, Perception and Misperception, chapter 2.

7. Traditional Diplomacy
Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy, chs. II-III, X.

II. Complicating Factors

8. Intermediaries

9. Implementation

III. Types of Situations

10. Diplomatic Dialogues

11. Diplomatic Breakthroughs

12. Continuing Crises
Jack Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb, pp. 1-64
or Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, preface
and pp. 1-126.

13. At the Brink