

Comparative Politics Survey G6412
Spring 2013
Monday 2:10-4:00
Meets in 402 IAB

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Overview

This course offers a survey of major themes in comparative politics. It is one of two survey courses in comparative politics offered by the department. The two courses complement each other, but need not be taken in any particular order. This course generally focuses on substantive topics, such as institutions, mobilization, redistribution, representation, and violence. The course is designed for Ph.D. students who are preparing to take comprehensive exams, but is open to other students as well. Ph.D. students preparing for comprehensive exams will be given preference over other students.

The course includes a great deal of student involvement and is really designed to help you educate yourselves about the major themes in comparative politics and develop the analytic skills need to conduct research at a high level.

Requirements and Evaluation

The requirements include:

Participation in Seminar: Students must be prepared each week to discuss the core readings. Students who are making any sort of presentation are exempt from this requirement [20 percent of grade].

Presentation. Each student will make one presentation. (20 percent)

Critical Essays: Each student will write a critical essay (20 percent)

Data Critique: Each Student will write one data report and critique. (10 percent)

Final paper: Each student will write a short paper (10 pages or so) that identifies a research question, explains why this question is important, and then proposes a strategy for answering the question. Feel free to conduct the data analysis if time and topic permit. (30 percent)

Presentations

Each week, 15-30 minutes of the seminar will be devoted to presentations by students on questions that are posed on the syllabus or on topics proposed by the students. These presentations should be 12-15 minutes each, and should be presented using slides. We will then have discussions about the materials. In general, weak presentations will simply summarize the readings ("Smith says x, Jones says y"). Strong presentations will

Describe any key conceptual issues that must be addressed by work on the question (e.g., a presentation on inequality might discuss different ways of conceptualizing inequality);

Describe the central arguments/debates in the literature on the question (e.g., a presentation on corruption might focus on different types of variables –such as regime type, decentralization, level of development -- that influence corruption levels);

Describe thorny methodological issues that bedevil work on the question (e.g., a presentation on social revolutions might discuss the problems created by the small-n nature of the phenomenon).

Offer criticisms and/or suggest pathways for future research.

To help students get started, the syllabus lists "Suggested Readings." These might serve as a place to begin, but students must do their own bibliographic research. Students should obviously not feel obligated to cover all of these suggested readings. Students should post their presentations on the "Lecture" section of CourseWorks. They should also create a bibliography of the works they have consulted.

Written essay

Each student will write an essay that advances an argument related to at least one of the readings for the week. The best papers will make an original argument and present a critical summary of the existing research on a question raised in that week. The papers need not cover all the readings in a given week, but they do need to present an argument based on at least one of those readings. All research papers are should be posted on the class website on Courseworks by Sunday at 6 PM . Students will be expected to be familiar with their colleagues' papers. Papers are limited to 5 double-spaced pages with 12 point font.

As with the presentations, students should create a bibliography of the works they have consulted. Students may post entries from this bibliography to the course bibliographic data base if they are willing.

Data reports

Students will write a short paper that analyzes the data used to study the topic for the week. The best reports will

Describe the conceptual variable(s) that are being measured by the data that is the topic of the report. For example, a presentation on measuring party locations would simply state that the data described are used to place parties in an ideological space, and might then describe different ways of conceptualizing this space

Describe what data exist on the topic. For example, the party locations presentation might include data from mass surveys, elite surveys, party manifestos, or legislative roll calls.

Give (brief) examples of how the data have been used.

Discuss (briefly) any significant controversies that exist regarding measurement.

Provide links to relevant codebooks or data sets.

I have in mind a brief document for this assignment (3-4 pages), with useful links to data, codebooks, or especially relevant bibliographic resources. All reports should be posted to the relevant "Assignment" in CourseWorks.

Students can choose which Data question to answer, and "property rights" will be "first come, first served" (i.e., the first person to tell me they want to work on a specific question will be allowed to do so, with only

one person working on each topic). Also, the questions are "suggested" – if a student would like to pose and answer a different data question, including data questions about archives or other important resources for qualitative research, they can do so with my approval.

Final Paper

The research design paper should be (10 pages or so) that identifies a research question, explains why this question is important, and then proposes a strategy for answering the question. A weak paper will simply do the above. A strong paper will propose a novel topic that sheds light on an important debate; identifies how and why this paper makes a contribution to the literature, and proposes a clear research strategy. A strong paper will also include a careful critique of the research design identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the proposal. You can also present a finished paper complete with data-analysis, but this may be difficult given time constraints.

Materials

Most works are available from JSTOR or the Columbia Electronic Library. These are marked with “J.” I will also post works on the Courseworks website. These are marked with a “C.” Many are also available via Google and other electronic sources. The readings may change in some weeks based on student interest.

Required Reading available through Book Culture 536 W. 112th between Broadway and Amsterdam.

- 1) Boix, Carles. *Redistribution and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- 2) Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
- 3) Wilkinson, Steven. 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge University Press.

Jan. 28. Week 1. Introduction: Thinking about Thinking

Lehrer, John. 2008. “Eureka” *New Yorker* C.

Heath, Chip and Stan Heath *Made To Stick*, Introduction, 1, 4, 6, Epilogue. C

Recommended:

Van Oech, Roger. 1983. *A Whack on the Side of the Head. How You Can Be More Creative*.

Feb. 4. Week 2. Institutional Legacies and Causation

Main Discussion: Do institutional legacies influence contemporary outcomes? How can we know whether this is the case?

Kitschelt, Herbert. 2002. “Accounting for Postcommunist Regime Diversity: What Counts as a Good Cause?” In *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Gregorz Ekiert and Stephen Hanson, Cambridge University Press. C.

Darden, Keith and Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2006. “The Great Divide: Literacy, nationalism and the communist collapse.” *World Politics*. 59: 1, 83-115. J.

Wittenberg, Jason. "What is a Historical Legacy?" 2011. Berkeley, <http://witty.berkeley.edu/Legacies.pdf>

Engerman S, Sokoloff K. 2002. Factor endowments, inequality, and paths of development among New World economies. *Economia* 3(1):41-88 C.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development." *American Economic Review* 91:5 1369-1401. J.

Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth*, September, 2004 J

Recommended:

Acemoglu, Daron, James Robinson, and Simon Johnson. 2005. "A Response to Albuoy's 'A Reexamination Based on Improved Settler Mortality Data.'"

http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jr_Response_to_DavidAlbuoyMarch222005_0.pdf

Coatsworth, John. 2005. "Structures, Endowments and Institutions in the Economic History of Latin America," *Latin American Research Review*, 40:3.

Presentation Topic One: Is "path dependence" a useful concept?

Scott Page. 2006. "Path Dependence." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 1: 87-115. J

Qwerty, David, Paul A., "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY" (in Economic History: A Necessary Though Not Sufficient Condition for an Economist), *American Economic Review*, Vol. 75, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1985), pp. 332-337. J.

Presentation Topic Two: To what extent can field experiments resolve debates about the relationship between institutions and economic development?

Deaton, A (2009) "Instruments of development: Randomization in the tropics, and the search for the elusive keys to economic development, NBER Working Paper 14690 <http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14690>

Alan S. Gerber, Donald P. Green, and Edward H. Kaplan. "The Illusion of Learning from Observational Research." from *Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics*, edited by Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, Tarek E. Masoud. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2009. "Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development" *Annual Review of Political Science*

Duflo, Esther, Rachel Glennerster, and Michael Kremer, "Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit", <http://econwww.mit.edu/files/806> <http://www.nber.org/papers/t0333>

Various Authors in APSA-CD Newsletter October 2011 symposium on experiments.

Recommended:

Pop-Eleches, Grigore 2007. "Historical Legacies and Post-Communist Regime Change." *The Journal of Politics* 69: 4, 908-926.

Wittenberg J. 2006. *Crucibles of Political Loyalty: Church Institutions and Electoral Continuity in Hungary*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press

Feb. 11. Week 3. Representation and Accountability

“Introduction.” Plus. “Elections and Representation” by Manin, Bernard and Adam Przeworski and Susan Stokes in *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, ed. by Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, Bernard Manin, New York: Cambridge University Press. C.

Fearon, James. 1999. “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians” in *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, ed. by Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, Bernard Manin, New York: Cambridge University Press. C.

Leslie Swaindt Bayer and Miki Caulson. 2012. *The Gendered Effect of Electoral Institutions*. TBA.

Powell, Bingham and Guy Whitten. 1993. “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Into Account the Political Context.” *American Journal of Political Science*. 37:391-414. J.

Bark Andreas Kayser and Michael Peress. 2012. “Benchmarking Across BorderL Electoral Accountability and the Necessity of Comparison.” *American Political Science Review* 106:3, 661-683.

Besley, Tim and Burgess, Robin. 2002. The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 117/4.
<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/00335530232093506>

Recommended:

Susan Stokes. “Policy Switches” Stokes, Susan.1999. What Do Policy Switches Tell Us about Democracy? in Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin, eds. *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, New York: Cambridge University Press. C.

Besley, Timothy. 2005. “Political Selection.” *Journal of Political Economy*. J.

Presentation Topic One: What determines the choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies?

Boix, Carles. 1999. Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies, *American Political Science Review* 93:3: 609-624.

Cusack, Thomas, Iversen Torben, and David Soskice. 2007. Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems. *American Political Science Review* 101 3 :373-391.

Calvo, Ernesto. 2009. The competitive road to proportional representation: partisan biases and electoral regimes under increasing party competition. *World Politics*. 61:2, 254- 295.

Kreuzer,Markus. *American Political Science Review*. 2010.

Response by Cusack et al. APSR. 2010.

Response by Boix. APSR. 2010.

Presentation Topic Two: Under what conditions are autocrats accountable?

Malesky, Edmund and Paul Schuler. 2012. "The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly." *American Political Science Review*, 106:4. 762-787.

Scott Gehlbach and Phil Keefer. 2011. "Investment without Democracy: Ruling-Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies." *Journal of Comparative Economics*. 39(2):123-139.

Besley, Timothy and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2007. "Making Autocracy Work." LSE STICERD Research Paper 48.

Weeks, Jessica L. Weeks. 2009. "Accountable Autocrats? Post-War Punishment in Authoritarian Regimes." Paper prepared for delivery at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Toronto, Ontario

Recommended:

Fiorina, Morris. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Maravall, Jose Maria. 2007. "Accountability and the Survival of Governments." In ed *the Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, Oxford: Oxford University Press. C.

Feb 18. Week 4. Redistribution and Inequality

Boix, Carles. *Redistribution and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, 1-131, 233-240.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1-3.

Hellman, Joel, "Winners Take All: The Pitfalls of Partial Reform," *World Politics*, January 1998. J.

Presentation Topic One: What determines preferences over redistribution?

Swenson, Peter 1991. "Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered." *World Politics* 43: 7, 513-544.

Denisova I, Eller M, Frye T, Zhuravskaya E. 2009. Who wants to revise privatization: the complementarity of institutions and market skills. *American Political Science Review*. 103(2):284--304

Mares, Isabela. 2001. *The Politics of Social Risk*, New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 2. C.

Iversen, T. and David Soskice. "An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preference" 2001. *American Political Science Review* vol.95, No.4: 875-893. J.

Shafer, Michael. 1994. *Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States* Cornell University Press, 1994 .

Presentation Topic Two: Under what conditions do politicians support core or swing voters?

Cox, Gary and Matthew McCubbins. 1986. "Electoral Politics in a Redistributive Game." *Journal of Politics*. 48, 370-89.

Dixit, Avinash and Johnathan Londregan. 1996. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics." *Journal of Politics*. 58, 1132-55.

Mcgillivray, Fiona. 2004. *Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industry Policy*. Princeton University Press.

Recommended:

Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy*. 89, 914-27.

Feb. 25. Week 5. Welfare State Public Goods, Private Goods and Welfare Policy

Esping-Andersen, Gosta. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, chapters 1-3.

Carnes, Mathew and Isabela Mares. 2007. "Social Policy in Developing Countries." *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford University Press.

Bartels, Larry. 2010. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton University Press. 1-4.

Lupu, Noam and Jonas Pontusson. 2011 "The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution" *American Political Science Review* 105 (2): 316-336.

Presentation Topic One: Under What conditions can private groups provide public goods for their members?

Alesina, Alberto and Glaeser, Edward *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe*, chapters 4 and 6.

Paul Milgrom, et al. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: the Law Merchant, Private Judges and the Champagne Fairs, *Economics and Politics* 1990:2 1-23. **J**

Dietz, T, E., Ostrom, and PC Stern. "The struggle to govern the commons." *Science (AAAS)* 302, no. 5652 (2003): 1907.

Frye, Timothy. 2000. *Brokers and Bureaucrats: Building Market Institutions In Russia*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Presentation Topic Two: "Does ethnicity influence the provision of public goods, if so, how?"

Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein. (2007). "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision? An Experimental Approach", *APSR*, 101(4), 709-725. <http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/HHPW.pdf>

Miguel, Edward. 2004. "Tribe or Nation? Nation-Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania," *World Politics* 56: 327-362.

Recommended:

Iverson, Torben and Frances Rosenbluth, 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press,, chapters 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7.

Lake, David and Matthew Baum. 2001. "The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services," *Comparative Political Studies* 34: 587-621.

March. 4. Week 6. Small group meetings to discuss paper topics. Paper topics due. Tuesday March 2 at 5:00.

March 11. Week 7. Civil War

Main Discussion: What Causes Civil Wars?

Sambanis, Nicholas (2004) .What is Civil War. Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition., *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, 814-858. J.

Blattman, Christopher and Edward Miguel. 2010. "Civil War," *Journal of Economic Literature* 48(1), 3-57. J.

Weinstein, Jeremy. 2007. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) TBA.

Fearon, James, David Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97: 91-106. J.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers*. 56:563-595. J.

Presentation Topic One: Do economic shocks influence civil wars?

Sambanis, Nicholas, Miguel, Edward, Satyanath, Shanker, and Ernest Sergenti (2004), .Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach., *Journal of Political Economy* 112, 725-753.

Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom (2004), On the Duration of Civil War., *Journal of Peace Research* 41, 253-273.

Recommended:

Kalyvas, Stathys. 2006. *The Logic Of Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press. TBA

-----**March 18** -----**Spring Break** -----**No Class**

March 25. Week 8. Corruption

Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. 1993. "Corruption" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, August, 599-617.

Hellman JS, Jones G, Kaufmann D. 2003. "Seize the state, seize the day: an empirical analysis of state capture and corruption in transition economies." *Journal of Compative Economics* 31(4):751--73

Daniel Treisman, "What Have We Learned about Corruption?" *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2007. 10:211-244.

Claudio Ferraz and Fred Finan. (2008). "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes", QJE, 123(2), 703-745. J.
<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703>

Sandra Sequiera. "Advances in Measuring Corruption in the Field." Ms. Also as chapter in *New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption*. Ed. Danila Serra and Leonard Wantchekon.

Noah Buckley and Tim Frye. 2012. "Bribes and Badges: A Survey Experiment on Police Corruption in Moscow." Ms.

Recommended:

New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption. Ed. Danila Serra and Leonard Wantchekon.

Presentation Topic One: How can governance be measured?

Kurtz, Marcus Kurtz and Andrew Schrenk. "Growth and Governance: Models, Measures and 2007. "Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and Mechanisms." *Journal of Politics* Vol. 69:2 (May).2007. also "Growth and Governance: A Defense" *Journal of Politics* 69:2. May. J

Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2007. "Growth and Governance: A Reply." *Journal of Politics* 69, 2: 555–562. J

Steven Voight. "How (Not) to Measure Institutions?"

Presentation Topic Two: Can greater transparency reduce corruption?

John McMillan and Pablo Zoido. "How To Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2004. 18:4, 69-92. [JSTOR.] Also available electronically via the library.

Brunetti, A., and B. Weder, "A Free Press Is Bad News for Corruption," *Journal of Public Economics*, 87 (2003), 1801–182

Reinikka, R., and J. Svensson, "Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 3(2–3) (2005), 259–267.

Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, Jeanet Bentzen, Carl-Johan Dalgaard, and Pablo Selaya. 2011. "Does the Internet Reduce Corruption? Evidence from U.S. States and across Countries." *World Bank Economic Observer*.

Recommended:

Olken, Benjamin and Patrick Barron. "The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh. Working Paper 13145 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w13145>

Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean Francois-Richard. 2003. "Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect." *European Economic Review* 47: 165-195.

Scott Gehlbach. 2006. "The Consequences of Collective Action: An Incomplete Contracts Approach." *American Journal of Political Science*. 50:3, 802-823.

Fisman, Raymond (2001), "Estimating the Value of Political Connections." *American Economic Review* 91 (4), pp. 1095-1102. http://www-1.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/rfisman/estimating_the_value.pdf

April 1. Week 9. Natural Resources and Democracy

Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Introduction" *What Is the Problem with Natural Resource Wealth?*, 1-20.

Haber, Stephen and Victor Menaldo, 2011. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse," *American Political Science Review*. Feb. 1-26.

Ross, Stephen and Jørgen Juel Andersen 2011. "Making the Resource Curse Disappear: A re-examination of Haber and Menaldo's "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism?" Draft: September 30, 2011.

Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes* (Cambridge University Press. 1-36. 107-146.

Egorov G, Guriev S, Sonin K. 2009. "Why resource poor dictators allow freer media: a theory and evidence from panel data." *American Political Science Review* 103(4):645--68

Recommended: Tsui, Kevin. "More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries." Ms. Clemson University, January 20, 2009

Presentation Topic One: Does development aid function as a natural resource curse?

Djankov, Simeon, Jose G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol. "The Curse of Aid." *Journal of Economic Growth*. <http://www.springerlink.com/content/b5369m3870553gl7/fulltext.pdf>

Morrison, Kevin M. What Can We Learn about the "Resource Curse" from Foreign Aid? *World Bank Research Observer*. Advance Access published October 27, 2010. Also C.

Recommended:

Sachs, J. and A. M. Warner. 1995. "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth." NBER Working Paper No. 5398.

Sachs, J. and A. M. Warner. 2001. "The Curse of Natural Resources." *European Economic Review* 45(4-6): 827-38.

Robinson, James A., Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier. 2006. The Political Foundations of the Resource Curse. *Journal of Development Economics* 79: 2, 447-468

Presentation Topic Two: What are secure property rights and how do they come about?

North, Douglass C. and Barry Weingast, "Constitutions and Credible Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England," *Journal of Economic History*, 49, 803-832.

Stasavage, David. 2002. "Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*. 18, 1. 155-86.

Coase, Ronald. 1960. "The Problem of Social Cost." *The Journal of Law and Economics* 3:1, 1-44, J C

Glaeser, Glaeser, Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer and Simon Johnson. 2001. "Coase Against the Coasians." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* August, 116: 3, 853-899. Skim.

Stephen Haber et al. 2003. *The Politics of Property Rights: Political instability, Credible Commitments and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929*. Cambridge University Press. 1-3, 9.

Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. 2005. "Unbundling Institutions." *Journal of Political Economy*. 113: 5, 949-995.

Philip Keefer and Steven C. Knack. 2002. Polarization, Politics and Property Rights: Links Between Inequality and Growth. *Public Choice* 111 April 1-2, 127-154.

Benjamin Jones and Benjamin Olken 2005. "Do Leaders Matter? National Leaders and Growth Since World War II." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. Vol. 120, No. 3, 835-864 J

April 8. Week 10.

Main Discussion: Under what conditions do people take part in politics? Why does participation take the form that it does?

Trejo, Guillermo. 2009. "Religious Competition and Ethnic Mobilization in Latin America: Why the Catholic Church Promotes Indigenous Movements in Mexico," *American Political Science Review* 103:3. J.

Mark Beissinger. 2002. *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. New York: Cambridge University Press. C. TBD.

Alexander Scacco. "Who Riots." Ms. NYU.

Lyll Jason. 2010. "Are co-ethnics more effective counter-insurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War." *American Political Science Review* 104(1):1—20. J.

Kuran, Timur 1991. "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolutions of 1989." *World Politics* 44:1, 7-48. J.

Presentation Topic One: What determines voter turnout?

TBD.

Presentation Topic Two: Is "contentious politics" a useful concept?

Douglas Macadam and Charles Tilly. 2007.

Sydney Tarrow. 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. C.

Recommended:

Susanne Lohmann 1994. "Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany 1989-91." *World Politics*, October.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1-65. C.

April 15. Week 11. Violence in Politics

Main Discussion: What role does violence play in politics?

Wilkinson, Steven. 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge University Press. C. TBA.

Leonard Wantchekon, 2004. The Paradox of "Warlord" Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation. *American Political Science Review* 98 (1): 17-33.

Elisabeth Jean Wood. 2001. "An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular Mobilization, Economic Interests and Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador," *Comparative Political Studies* 2001 34: 86

Chacon, Mario, James Robinson, and Ragnar Torvik. 2011. "When is Democracy an Equilibrium: Evidence from Colombia's 'a Violencia.'" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55:3, 366-396.
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/violencia_published_0.pdf

Horowitz, David L. *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*, Berkeley: University of California Press 2001. Chapters 1, 13.

Presentation Topic One: How does warmaking affect statemaking, if at all?

Charles Tilly, 1985. "The State as Protection Racket." in *Bringing the State Back In* edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jeffrey Herbst. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton University Press. TBA. C

Robinson, James. "Review of States and Power in Africa" *Journal of Economic Literature*. Vol. XL (June 2002), pp. 510-51.

Golden, Miriam and Devesh Tiwari. 2009. "Criminality and Malfeasance. Among National Legislators in India." ms. UCLA and UCSD, respectively.

Bates, Robert. 1981. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*. C.

Presentation Topic Two: The military is typically the greatest obstacle to democratization. Do you agree?

Geddes, Barbara, 1999. "What do We Know about Democratization?" *Annual Review. Political Science*. 2:115,-44

Goemans, Hein and Alexandre Debs. 2010. "Regime Type, The Fate of Leaders and War." *American Political Science Review*, Volume 104, No. 3 (August), pp. 430-446.

Recommended:

Diego Gambetta, 1994. *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business Of Private Protection*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Acemoglu, Daron James A. Robinson, Rafael J. Santos. The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia." [ms](#).

Jack Snyder. 2000. *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* New York WW Norton & Company Inc., Chapter 1. C.

Elisabeth Jean Wood. 2001. "An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular Mobilization, Economic Interests and Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador," *Comparative Political Studies* 2001 34: 86

Volkov, Vadim. 2002. *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Role of Force in Russian Capitalism*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Recommended:

Olken, Benjamin. 2008. "Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia." NBER Working Paper No. 14123. C

April 22. Week 12. Clientelism

Stokes, Susan, 2007. "Political Clientelism." *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford University Press.

Murillo, Maria Victoria and Ernesto Calvo. 2009." Selecting Clients: Partisan Networks and the Electoral Benefits of Targeted Distribution." Ms.

Susan Stokes. "Perverse Accountability." 2005. *American Political Science Review*, 99: 315-325.

Keefer, Philip Keefer and Razvan Vlaicu. 2008. "Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*. October. 24 (2), pp. 371-406 .

Pecreo Vicente and Leonard Wantchekon 2009. "Clientelism and Vote Buying: Lessons from African Elections." *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 25:2, 292-305.

[http://www.princeton.edu/~lwantche/Clientelism and Vote Buying Oxford Review of Economic Policy 2009](http://www.princeton.edu/~lwantche/Clientelism_and_Vote_Buying_Oxford_Review_of_Economic_Policy_2009)

Frye, Timothy, Ora John Reuter, and David Szakonyi. 2012. "Machines at Work: Workplace Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in Russia."

Recommended:

Gans, Morse, Jordan Mazzuca, and Simeon Nichter, 2010. "Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics During Elections." Ms.

Calvo, Ernesto and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2004. "Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 742-757.

Presentation Topic: Where do good states come from?

Andrei Shleifer and Edward Glaeser. 2002. "Legal Origins." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* November, 1193-1229. J

Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, and Jean Francois-Richard. 2003. "The Transplant Effect." *American Journal of Comparative Law* 51: 163-204. J.

Scott, James C. 1969. "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change." *American Political Science Review* 63 (December): 1142-52.

Recommended: <http://www.essex.ac.uk/government/electoralmalpractice/bibliography.html>

April 29. Week 13. Presentations of Research Paper

May 6. Week 14. Presentations of Research Paper

APPENDIX: Other Possibilities:

Bureaucracy

Main discussion Topic: How does politics influence bureaucratic design and performance?

Huber, John and Charles Shipan, *Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. New York Cambridge. University Press. Chaps 1-4, 6.

Geddes, Barbara. "A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies," *American Political Science Review* 85:2 (1991), 371-92. (for more see her book, *Politicians' Dilemma*.)

Moe, Terry. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story." *Journal of Law Economics and Organization* 1990 7: 213-253. Also Comment by Williamson. **C, J**

Cooter, Robert. 2000. "Administering" *The Strategic Constitution*." Princeton University Press. 79-99.