

Political Science G6411

COMPARATIVE POLITICS SURVEY I

FALL, 2011

1302 International Affairs Building
Mondays, 6:10-8:00

John Huber
jdh39@columbia.edu
713 IAB
Office hours: Tuesdays, 2:30-3:30 and by appointment

OVERVIEW

This seminar is part of a two-course sequence that surveys major questions that motivate contemporary research in comparative politics. The course is designed to introduce PhD students to the modern subfield, and to help prepare them for success on the comparative comprehensive exam. The course should also help students to develop skills that are necessary to become successful teachers and scholars in the comparative subfield.

This first part of the sequence focuses on the "building blocks" of many arguments in comparative politics: institutions, culture, parties, groups, and regime types. The second course, next semester, will focus on central substantive issues motivating the subfield, including violence, development, stability, growth, inequality, and redistribution. Either course can satisfy the "three field survey" requirement in the PhD program.

This course is intended for PhD students preparing for qualifying exams and enrollment is limited. Doctoral students will be given priority and the requirements of the PhD program will be considered if it is necessary to establish priority among them.

REQUIREMENTS AND EVALUATION

The requirements are as follows:

Class Participation – 20% of the final grade. Students are expected to read the assigned works closely and will be graded on both their knowledge of the material and their contributions in the seminar discussions.

3 Response Papers – 10% of the final grade each. Students must submit one paper during each of the following three sections of the course: (1) September 17-October 1, (2) October 8-29, (3) November 12-December 3. Students can choose any week during these periods to write their paper. Papers must be posted on Courseworks by noon the day of

class. Response papers must focus on the substantive topic of that weeks readings (so, for example, if you turn in a paper on September 17 it must focus on the culture and divided societies. The response papers are not summaries of readings. Instead, good response papers advance an original argument based on thinking about the readings. In so doing, students should demonstrate a clear understanding of more than one reading for that week. For example, a student writing on "Institutions" (Oct. 1) might critique the use of coordination games as metaphors for institutions, or might argue that path dependence arguments are unhelpful because []. Students will be expected to read their colleagues' papers before class. Papers are limited to two double-spaced pages with 12 point font.

Practice Comp – December 10. 50 % of the final grade. In the final class session students will have one hour to answer one out of three questions posed. The three potential questions will be circulated in advance and students will be expected to do some reading of relevant research that is not on the syllabus. Further information will be provided in class.

Books to be purchased. Students should purchase the following books:

Gary Cox, *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1997

Beatriz Magaloni. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico.*

Huber, John and Charles Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy.* New York Cambridge. University Press.

September 10. Introduction

Background readings:

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchak, *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions*, (chapters 5, 8, 9)

Riker, "Implications from the disequilibrium of majority rule for the study of institutions." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 74, No.2. (Jun., 1980), pp. 432-446.

September 17: Culture and divided societies

Posner, Daniel. 2004. "The Political Salience of Cultural Differences: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi." *American Political Science Review* 98:529-46.

- Laitin, David. 1998. *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, Chapters 1-3.
- Kasara, Kimuli. 2007. Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa. *American Political Science Review* 101 (1).
- Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein. (2007). "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision? An Experimental Approach", *American Political Science Review* 101(4), 709-725.
- Corstange, Daniel. 2012. "Religion, Pluralism, and Iconography in the Public Sphere: Theory and Evidence From Lebanon" *World Politics*, Volume 64, Number 1, January 2012, pp. 116-160
- Optional: Baldwin, Kate and John Huber. 2010. "Cultural vs. Economic Differences: Forms of ethnic diversity and public goods provision" *American Political Science Review* 104.4 (Dec 2010): 644-662. 2010.

September 24: Collective Action, Free riding and Mobilization

- Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), chapter 2
- Chong, Dennis. 1991. *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 1-2
- Scott, James C. 1976. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* New Haven: Yale University Press, Chapters 1 & 7.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1.
- Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy Weinstein, 2008. "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War" *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 5, No.2: 436-455.
- Blattman, Christopher. 2009. "From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda." *American Political Science Review* 103(2): 231-47.

October 1: Institutions

- David, Paul A., "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY" (in Economic History: A Necessary Though Not Sufficient Condition for an Economist), *American Economic Review*, Vol. 75, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1985), pp. 332-337.
- Paul Milgrom, et al. 1990. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: the Law Merchant, Private Judges and the Champagne Fairs," *Economics and Politics* 2 1-23.
- Robert Bates. 1990. "Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Development," in ed. J. Alt and K. Shepsle, *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*. Cambridge University Press. 31-54. C
- Weingast, Barry. 2002. Rational Choice Institutionalism. In *Political Science: State of the Discipline*, edited by I. Katznelson and H. Milner. New York: Norton.
- Carey, John M. 2000. "Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions" *Comparative Political Studies* 33: 735-61

October 8: Endogenous institutions (and the problems associated with understanding the effects of institutions)

- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development." *American Economic Review* 91:5 1369-1401. J.
- Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth*, September,
- Banerjee, Abhijit and Lakshmi Iyer. 2005. "History Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India", (with Lakshmi Iyer) *American Economic Review*, Vol. 95(4), pp. 1190-1213
- Greif, Avner. 2006. *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 6 & 7
- Mares, Isabela and Lucas Leemann. 2012. "The Adoption of Proportional

Representation." Typescript, Columbia University.

October 15. The State

North, Douglass. 1981. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. New York: W.W. Norton, Part 1

Peter B. Evans. 1989. "Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State," *Sociological Forum* 4: 561-587.

Tilly, Charles. 1992. *Coercion Capital and European States AD 990-1992*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, Chapter 3.

Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chapters 1, 4.

Robinson, James. 2002. "States and Power in Africa by Jeffrey I. Herbst: A Review Essay." *Journal of Economic Literature* Vol. XL (June 2002), pp. 510-519

October 22. Autocracy

Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 115-44.

Stephen Haber. 2007. "Authoritarian Government." In Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*.

Beatriz Magaloni. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. Introduction and Chapters 1-4. 1-150.

Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski. 2006. "Cooperation, Cooptation and Rebellion Under Dictatorships." *Economics and Politics*. 18,1, 1-25.

Edmund Malesky and Paul Schuler. 2010. "Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament." *American Political Science Review*, 104(03):482-502.

October 29: Democracy

Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, Chapters 1.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development. Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1 & 2.

Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, chapters 1-3

Treier, Shawn and Simon Jackman. 2008. "Democracy as a Latent Variable." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, No. 1: 201–217.

November 5: NO CLASS

November 12: Parties and Elections

Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Chapters 1 & 2.

Gary Cox, *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1997, chapters 1-5, 10.

Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Cleavage Structure, Party System and Voter Alignments: An Introduction. In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, edited by S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan. New York: Free Press.

Ordeshook and Shvetsova, "Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties" *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 38, No. 1. (Feb., 1994), pp. 100-123.

Hirano, Shigeo. 2011. "Do Individual Representatives Influence Government Transfers? Evidence from Japan" *The Journal of Politics* 73 (04): 1081-1094

November 19: Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Federalism

Shugart, Matthew Soberg and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chapters 1-4.

Huber, John "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies," *American Political Science Review*, 1996

Tsebelis, G "Veto players and law production in parliamentary democracies: An empirical analysis," *American Political Science Review* 1999 v.93(3)

Weingast, Barry R. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 11(1):1-31.

Rodden, Jonathan, *Hamilton's Paradox: The promise and peril of fiscal federalism* (chapter 4)

November 26: Interest groups

Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), chapter 3

Cameron, David. 1984. Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society, In Goldthorpe, John, ed. *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 143- 178.

Mares, I. 2001. *The Politics of Social Risk*, New York: Cambridge UP, chapter 2.

McGillivray, Fiona. 2004. *Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy*." Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-3.

Snyder, James, Stephen Ansolabehere and John de Figueiredo. 2003 "Why is there so little money in politics." "Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(1): 105-130.

December 3. Delegation to bureaucracies and judges

Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts. 1992. *Economics, Organization and Management*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. chapters 5 and 6

Huber, John and Charles Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. New York Cambridge University Press. Chaps 1-4, 6.

LaPorta et al, n 2004. "Judicial Checks and Balances" *Journal of Political Economy* (2004)

Vanberg, Georg. 2011. •"Substance vs. Procedure: Constitutional Enforcement

and Constitutional Choice.” *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 80: 309-318.

December 10: Final "comprehensive exam"