6801x. International Relations Theory. Fall 2016.

Mondays, 2:10-4:00, in 1302 IAB   8/22/16
Jack Snyder -- jls6@columbia.edu, 854-8290; office: 1327 IAB;
office hours: Wednesdays, 2:10-4 and by appointment.
Teaching assistant: Hadas Aron <ha2284@columbia.edu>

Requirements:
(1) Three essays based on readings on the syllabus, 6 to 8 pages each, due on October 17, November 14, and December 12. These should address a single, focused question pertaining to a related group of two to four readings, such as a theoretical debate or the progress of a research program. Each essay should make a central argument answering the question that you pose. Topics might address such issues as the deductive coherence of the theory, the relationship between the logic of a theory and the empirical methods used to test it, the repair of theories in light of testing, how agency is related to structure in the theory, the criteria used to evaluate theory, how change is theorized, the effectiveness of debates in assessing, refining, developing, and refuting theory, and so forth. Each essay is 25% of your grade for the course.
(2) A final exam, taking the form of a proctored mock international relations comprehensive PhD exam, answering one question from the World Politics A section of the exam. During the December exam period. 20% of your grade.
(3) Regular, active, well-informed class participation, including at least one assignment to lead part of the discussion. 5%.

Readings: Required readings are on reserve at Lehman Library. Some but not all supplementary readings are also on reserve in Lehman. Required articles and some individual book chapters are available electronically on Courseworks. Asterisk (*) indicates a paperback ordered at the Book Culture bookstore, 536 W.112 St.
Book purchases are optional, not required.

Sept. 12. *What's a theory (of IR), what's it for, and how should it be evaluated?*

*Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 1-18, 88-99, 102-128, 163-170.
Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," *International Organization* 46
         (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425; or *Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of
         International Politics*, ch. 6, "Three Cultures of Anarchy," pp. 246-312.
Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80
         (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.
Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January
         1978), 167-214.
Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "How Not to Be Lakatos Intolerant,"
         International Studies Quarterly 46 (June 2002), pp. 231-262.

SUPPLEMENTARY:
Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research

Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, pp. 91-196.

Elman and Elman, eds., *Progress in International Relations Theory*, Lakatosian evaluation of power transition, institutional, and other IR research programs.

Jon Elster, *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*, ch. 1. Explanation by causal mechanism.

Milton Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics," in Friedman, *Essays in Positive Economics*, 3-43; "as if" theories.

Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, ch. 3-5.

Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, ch. 1-3.

Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry*.

Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel, eds., *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, esp. Schimmelpfennig, "Efficient Process Tracing," (e-book, 2014); James Mahoney, "Process Tracing and Historical Explanation," *Security Studies*, April-June 2015, on "hoop tests" and "smoking guns."

John G. Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization* 52 (Autumn 1998), pp. 855-885. Readable, comprehensive overview.

Eric Van Rythoven, "The perils of realist advocacy and the promise of securitization theory: Revisiting the tragedy of the Iraq War debate," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (September 2016): 487–511.

Sept. 19. *Structure and agency in IR research programs.*

*David Lake and Robert Powell, eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, chaps. by Lake and Powell, 3-38, Frieden, 39-76, Morrow, 77-114, Rogowski, 115-139, and Stein, 197-228.

Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization*, 32, Autumn 1978, pp. 881-911.

Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, ch. 1.

Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41, Summer 1987, 335-370.

SUPPLEMENTARY:

Robert Jervis, "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence," *World Politics* 41:2 (January 1989), 183-207, *or* Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," *World Politics* 40:3 (April 1988), 317-349, on values, beliefs, structures, and other exogenous factors shaping strategic choices and interactions.

James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, "Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View," *Handbook of International Relations* (2002 ed.), eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons. Structure and agency.

Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, "International Practices," *International Theory* 3:1 (2011), 1-36. Bargaining as both individual agency and structured in a community; plays off Schelling reading for next week.

David A. Lake, "Theory is Dead, Long Live Theory: The End of the Great Debates and the Rise of Eclecticism in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 19 (2013), pp. 567-587.

James Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," *World Politics*, January 1991. Rationality as the default standard in counterfactuals.

Sept. 26. *Strategy and bargaining in anarchical systems* (co-taught with Richard Betts)

*John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, ch. 5.

Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, ch. 2.

Fearon, James D. (1995). "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.

*Dan Reiter, *How Wars End*, ch. 3, "Credible Commitments and War Termination."

*Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, ch. 2; also browse ch. 8, 9.

Stacie Goddard, "When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of Power," *International Security* 33, Winter 2008/09, pp. 110-42.

Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, spring 1993.

*Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret edition only:
Book I, Chaps. 1, 2, and 7 (conceptualization of war, "friction"); Book III, Chap. 1 (connects with Schelling); Book VII, Chap. 22 ("The Culminating Point of Victory," when to stop in limited war, skim and compare with Reiter); Book VIII, Chap. 2 (absolute and real war), Book VIII, Chap. 3 pp. 582-589 only, and Chap. 6 (war as instrument of policy).

SUPPLEMENTARY:

Joshua S. Goldstein, *Winning the War on War*, ch. 2 & 10, or Steven Pinker, *Better Angels of Our Nature*; Symposium: "Has Violence Declined in World Politics? Discussion of Goldstein, *Winning…*," *Perspectives on Politics* 11:2, June 2013.

Fazal, Tanisha M. "State Death in the International System," *International Organization* 58 (April 2004), pp. 311-344.

Fearon, James D. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization* 52 (2): 269–305.

Andrew Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation," *International Organization* 54 (2000), pp. 325-357.

Charles Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help," *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994), pp. 50-91.

Charles Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," *World Politics*, 50:1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201.

Alex Weisiger, *Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, ch. 2 and 3.

Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations*, ch. 3-4.

Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," *International Organization* 49 (Spring 1995).

J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*, ch. 2, "Man, the State, and War."

Rose McDermott, "Sex and Death: Gender Differences in Aggressions and Motivations for Violence," *International Organization* 69:3 (summer 2015), 753-775.

Robert Jervis, *System Effects,* ch. 2, 4, 5, and 7.

Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, ch. 6, on "the third image."

Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*, ch. 8, 3d ed. Precursor of bargaining theory.

Stephen Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914," *World Politics* 38:1 (Oct. 1985), 80-117.

Robert Powell, "Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power," *International Organization* 69:3 (Summer 2015), 589-626, formal model of "stability-instability paradox."

Oct. 3. *Origins and evolution of states systems and regional subsystems; how to theorize change in IR.*

John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity," *World Politics* 35 (January 1983), review essay on Waltz.

William Wohlforth et al, "Testing Balance of Power Theory in World History," *European Journal of International Relations* 13 (2), 155-185.

READ ANY TWO OF THE FOLLOWING THREE:
*1. Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, ch. 3-4. War made the state, and the state made war, and eventually they both made nationalism and popular sovereignty.
*2. Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*, ch. 5. Alliance of crown and town.
*3. Daniel Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe*, ch. 2-4. The Reformation did it.

SUPPLEMENTARY (READ ONE IN YOUR AREA OF INTEREST):
Hendrik Spruyt, "Institutional Selection in International Relations," *IO* 52 (1998), 855-85; similar to Spruyt, ch. 8.

Victoria Tin-bor Hui, "Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics: Comparing Ancient China and Early Modern Europe," *International Organization*, winter 2004, and Victoria Hui, *War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe*, ch. 4.

Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," *International Organization* 47:1 (1992)

Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty*, ch. 1 and 2.

Marcus Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practice," *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 427-466.

Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and

Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," *International Organization*, Spring 2004. How sovereignty norms came to ASEAN.

Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn*, ch. 2. Internationalist versus nationalist coalitions; Middle East case.

David Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong," *International Security*, spring 2003. Amitav Acharya, "Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?" *International Security*, winter 2003-04. David Kang, "Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles inAsian International Relations," *International Security*, winter 2003-04.

Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State*, ch. 1-3. Claims that the moral purposes of domestic society are reflected in the norms of regional and historical international societies; short version in *IO* fall 1997.

Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism*. Ancient Chinese were realists, but realist ideas arose from and were transmitted through culture.

Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*; Ernest Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*.

Ronald Jepperson and John W. Meyer, "Multiple Levels of Analysis and the Limitations of Methodological Individualisms," *Sociological Theory* 29:1 (March 2011), 54-73. Agency/structure problem in Weber's *Protestant Ethic*.

Oct. 10. *The Democratic Peace research program: "the closest we have to a law"?*

John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19 (2): 87-125.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, "An Institutional Explanation for the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* 93 (December 1999), pp. 791-807.

Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51 (4), 513-53.

Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory," *American Political Science Review* 92 (2), 377-89; or Reiter and Stam, *Democracies at War, ch. 2* and browse.

Kenneth Schultz, "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War," *International Organization* 53:2 (Spring 1999), pp. 233-266.

Erik Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace," *American Journal of Political Science*, Jan. 2007.

Joanne Gowa, "The Democratic Peace after the Cold War," *Economics & Politics* 23:2 (2011), 153-171. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00382.x

SUPPLEMENTARY:

Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chs. 1, 3, 4 (through p. 97).

Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*, chapters 1-4.

Michael Desch, "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters," *International Security* 27:2 (Fall 2002), 5-47. Critique of Reiter and Stam; Alexander Downes, "How Smart and Tough Are Democracies?" *International*

Security 33:4 (Spring 2009), 9–51. Rebuttals to Reiter and Stam.

Anne Sartori, "The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes," *International Organization* 56 (Winter 2002), 121-150.

Alexandre Debs and H.E. Goemans, "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War," *American Political Science Review* 104, No. 3 (2010): 430–45.

Oct. 17. *Democracies and Autocracies in the International System*

Strategic interaction and bargaining between democracies and autocracies:

James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88 (September 1994), pp. 577-592.

Michael Tomz, "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach," *International Organization* (Fall 2007), pp. 821-840.

Jessica Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," International Organization 67 (1): 35-64.

Jessica Chen Weiss, "Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China," *International Organization* 67 (January 2013), pp. 1-35.

Jessica Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 106 (May 2012), pp. 326-47.

Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard, "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound," *American Political Science Review* (August 2011), pp. 437-458.

International-systemic and state-level causes of regime type:

Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* 49, no. 2 (January 1997): 155-83. Economic preconditions of democratic consolidation.

Carles Boix, "Democracy, Development, and the International System," *American Political Science Review*, November 2011

Seva Gunitsky, "From Shocks to Waves: Hegemonic Transitions and Democratization in the Twentieth Century," *International Organization* 68 (Summer 2014), 561-598.

Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, "Democratization during the Third Wave," *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 19 (2016), 125-144.

SUPPLEMENTARY

Alexander Downes and Todd Sechser, "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility," *International Organization* 66, Summer 2012, pp. 457-89.

Oct. 24. *International political economy* (co-taught with Allison Carnegie)

Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, "The Instruments of Trade Policy," in
      International Economics: Theory and Policy (Pearson, Addison, Wesley,
      2003), chapter 8.
Robert C. Feenstra and Alan M. Taylor. 2008, "Gains and Losses from Trade in the
      Specific-Factors Model," chap. 3, and "Trade and Resources: The Heckscher
      Ohlin Model," chap. 4, in Feenstra and Taylor, *International Trade*, 2d ed
      (2008).
Ronald Rogowski, "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade," *American
      Political. Science Review* 81:4 (December 1987): 1121-1137.
James E. Alt and Michael Gilligan, "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor
      Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions,"
      Journal of Political Philosophy 2:2 (1994), 165-192.
Michael Bailey, Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast, "The Institutional Roots of
      American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade," *World
      Politics* 49:3 (1997), 309-338.
Michael J. Hiscox, "The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade
      Liberalization" *International Organization* 53:4 (Autumn 1999), 669–698.

SUPPLEMENTARY
Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, "Protection for Sale," *The American
      Economic Review* 84: 4 (Sept. 1994), 833-850.
Jeffry Frieden, "Invested Interests," *International Organization* 45:4 (Autumn 1991),
      425-451.
Frieden, "The Governance of International Finance," *Annual Review of Political
      Science,* vol. 19 (2016), 33-48.
Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times,* ch. 3-4*.
Helen Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information*, ch. 1-4, & browse 5-8 chap.

Oct. 31. *International organization* (co-taught with Allison Carnegie)

What do IOs do?

1) Solve coordination problems:
*Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 7-10, 85-98 (top), and 111-116.

2) Solve a terms-of-trade problem.
Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger. 2009. "The WTO: Theory and Practice." NBER
      Working Paper # 15445

3) Provide a domestic commitment device:
Buthe, T. and H. V. Milner. 2008. The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into
      Developing Countries: Increasing FDI Through International Trade
      Agreements?" *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4):741-762.

4) "Not much:"
Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoon. 1996. "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50 (3): 379–406.
Note also Grieco and Mearsheimer in supplemental readings.

5) Solve political hold-up problems:
Allison Carnegie, "States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions," *American Political Science Review* 108:1(2014): 54-70.

6) Constructivist view:
Michael N. Barnett, and Martha Finnemore. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organization." *International Organization* 53:4 (1999.): 699-732.

7) Other mechanisms? Solving private information problems?

What shapes the design of IOs?

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization* 55 (4): 761–799.
Copelovitch and Putnam, "Design in Context: Existing International Agreements and New Cooperation," *International Organization* 68:2 (Spring 2014): 471-493.

SUPPLEMENTARY:
Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. "On Compliance." *International Organization* 47 (2): 175–206.
Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42:3 (summer 1988).
Steinberg, Richard. 2002. In the Shadow of Law and Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization* 56 (2): 339-374.
Dai, Xinyuan. 2002. "Information Systems in Treaty Regimes." *World Politics* 54 (4), 405-436.
Pollack, Mark A. 1997. "Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community." *International Organization* 51 (1): 99–134.
Mitchell, R. B. "Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance," *International Organization*, 1994, 48, 425-458.
John Ruggie, "Embedded Liberalism," *International Organization* 36:2 (Spring 1982), special issue on "International Regimes."
Krasner, "Life on the Pareto Frontier," *World Politics* 43:3 (April 1991): 336-66.
Page Fortna, "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace," *International Organization* 57:2 (Spring 2003), 337-372.
Erik Voeten, "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action," *American Political Science Review* 95 (2001), 845-58.

Erik Voeten, "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force," *International Organization* 59 (Summer 2005), 527-557.

John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, winter 1994/1995.

Grieco, Joseph M. (1988). Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. *International Organization*. 42(3): 485-507, on relative gains.

Nov. 7. NO CLASS—UNIVERSITY HOLIDAY

Nov. 14. *Law, Norms, and Rights* (co-taught with Tonya Putnam)

Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance," *International Organization* 54:3 (Summer 2000), 421-456.

Gillian K. Hadfield and Barry R. Weingast, "What is Law? A Coordination Model of the Characteristics of Legal Order," *Journal of Legal Analysis* 4:2 (2012), 471-514.

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization*, autumn 1998.

*Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (1998), Introduction (pp. 1-38), plus one of two empirical chapters (pp. 79-120, or 121-164).

*Beth A. Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 12-17 (overview of argument) and Ch. 7, pp. 256-306, on the torture convention

Emilie Hafner-Burton, "Sticks and Stones: The Efficacy of Human Rights 'Naming and Shaming,'" *International Organization* 62:4 (2008).

Laurence Helfer and Erik Voeten, "International courts as agents of legal change: evidence from LGBT rights in Europe," *International Organization* 68:1 (winter 2014), 77-110.

SUPPLEMENTARY:

Xinyuan Dai, "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism," *International Organization* 59 (2005), 363-398.

Jeff Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe," *International Organization* 59:4 (October 2005), 801-826, introduction to special issue, counterpoint to Finnemore and Sikkink.

Chaim Kaufmann and Robert Pape, "Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's...Campaign against the Slave Trade," *International Organization*, fall 1999.

Anne-Marie (Slaughter) Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration," *International Organization,* 47:1 (1993), 41-76, and subsequent debate with Geoffrey Garrett.

Thomas Risse, "Let's argue! Communicative action in world politics," *International Organization* 54 (Winter 2000), pp. 1-39.

James D. Morrow, "When Do States Follow the Laws of War?" *American Political Science Review* 101:3 (August 2007), pp. 559-572.

Emilie Hafner-Burton, *Making Human Rights A Reality* (Princeton, 2013), pp. 1-6, 21-40.

Stephen A. Kocs, "Explaining the Strategic Behavior of States: International Law as System Structure" *International Studies Quarterly*, 38:4 (December 1994) 535-556.

Jana Von Stein, "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance," *American Political Science Review* 99:4 (2005), 611-622, read with Simmons, *Mobilizing*.

Simmons, Beth A. and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2005. "The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods." *American Political Science Review*, 99:4, 623-631

Hathaway, Oona. 2007. "Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51:4, 588-621.

Emilie Hafner-Burton, Edward Mansfield, and Jon Pevehouse, "Human Rights Institutions, Sovereignty Costs and Democratization," *British Journal of Political Science* 45:1 (January 2015), 1-27.

Eric Neumeyer. 2007. "Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations to International Human Rights Treaties," *Journal of Legal Studies* 36:2, 397-429.

Nov. 21. *Perception and signaling* (co-taught with Robert Jervis)

*Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, foreword to the new edition.

Robert Jervis, "Signaling and Perception," in Kristen Monroe, ed., *Political Psychology*, 293-312.

Rose McDermott, "The Psychological Ideas of Amos Tversky and Their Relevance for Political Science," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13:1, 5-33.

Jonathan Mercer, "Emotional Beliefs," *International Organization* 64 (Winter 2010), pp. 1-31 (also see his "Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War," IO 67 (Spring 2013), 221-52, and, for an overview by several scholars, "Forum: Emotions and World Politics," *International Theory* 6 (November 2014), 490-594).

Keren Yarhi-Milo, "In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries," *International Security* 38 (Summer 2013), 7-51.

SUPPLEMENTARY OR REVIEW FROM PREVIOUS WEEKS
Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy," IS, vol. 34, Spring 2010, pp. 63-95.

"The Cognitive Science of Rationality," found at http://lesswrong.com/lw/7e5/the_cognitive_science_of_rationality/

Nina Tannenwald, "Ideas and Explanations: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vol. 7, Spring 2005, pp. 13-42.

Chihiro Hosoya, "Miscalculations in Deterrence Policy: Japanese-U.S. Relations, 1938-41," *Journal of Peace Research*, 1968, no. 2, pp. 97-115.

James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," IO, vol. 49, Summer 1995, pp. 379-414.

Jonathan Kirshner, "Rationalist Explanations for War?" *Security Studies*, vol. 10, Autumn 2000, pp. 143-50.

James Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 41, February 1997, 68-90.

Thomas Schelling, "The Role of War Games and Exercises," in Ashton Carter, John Steinbruner, and Charles Zraket, eds., *Managing Nuclear Operations*, 426-44.

James Blight and Janet Lang, "When Empathy Failed: Using Critical Oral History to Reassess the Collapse of US-Soviet Détente in the Carter-Brezhnev Years," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 12 (Spring 2010) 42-65 (only part of the article).

Hal Brands and David Palkki, "'Conspiring Bastards': Saddam Hussein's Strategic View of the   US," *Diplomatic History* 36 (June 2012) 625-59.

Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, 315-332.

Nov. 28. *Empire, hierarchy, and unipolarity*

*Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics,* ch. 3-4.

Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright, "What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate?" *American Political Science Review* 101:2 (2007), pp. 253-271.

S. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics*, April 1976.

*Paul K. McDonald, *Networks of Domination: The Social Foundations of Peripheral Conquest in International Politics*, ch. 2 for theory, ch. 3, pp. 46-66, 78-100, for India case.

AND READ ANY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:

*David Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*, read selectively, or Lake, "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations," *International Organization* 50:1 (Winter, 1996), pp. 1-33.

G. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization*, 44:3 (summer 1990).

*Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance*, read selectively.

SUPPLEMENTARY

Jeffry Frieden, "The Economics of Intervention: Overseas Investments and Relations With Underdeveloped Areas, 1890-1950," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 31, January 1989, pp. 55-80.

Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, "Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment," *International Security* 35:4 (Spring 2011), 7-44.

Nuno Monteiro, "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful," *International Security* 36:3 (2011/12), pp. 9-40, or Monteiro, *Theory of Unipolar Politics.*

Patrick J. McDonald, "Great Powers, Hierarchy, and Endogenous Regimes: Rethinking the Domestic Causes of Peace," *International Organization* 69:3 (Summer 2015), 557-588.

Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, ch. 2-3.

Hendrik Spruyt, *Ending Empire*, domestic coalition politics of decolonization.

T. McKeown, "Hegemonic Stability Theory and Nineteenth Century Tariff Levels in Europe," *International Organization*, winter 1983. Process-tracing critique of Krasner says the posited causal mechanisms don't match what actually happened.

David Lake and Scott James, "The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846," *International Organization*, winter 1989.

Dec. 5. *Civil war, international intervention, and terrorism* (co-taught with Michael Doyle)

Civil war

Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35 (1993), 27-47 (if necessary, review from Sept. 26).

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war," *American Political Science Review* 97 (February 2003), 75-90.

Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 104 (August 2010), 415-429.

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